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ABSTRACT 
Due to entrenched social caste divisions, discrimination against Dalits is a serious on-G.O.I.ng issue 
in contemporary India. This thesis focuses on how the caste system affects the lives and treatment of 
Dalits. It highlights that, as the caste system is the focal point of Hindu society, it affects every aspect 
of Indian life and is impossible to escape from. 
It also discusses how the government has attempted to close the gap of inequality using affirmative 
action policies. However, evidence suggests that the government is more concerned with the 
appearance of eradicating untouchability discrimination, than actually making continuous steps to 
help Dalits and change caste-based viewpoints. In many ways, the government has served to worsen 
the social divide.  
Dalits have fought for an escape from discrimination by converting to other religions, such as 
Buddhism and Christianity. Conversion to Buddhism has been moderately successful in uniting Dalits 
under a common goal of escaping untouchability, but has failed to create real separation from 
Hinduism. There are differences found between Christian denominations as to the treatment of Dalits. 
Pentecostalism has provided Dalits with a life completely devoid of caste. However, Dalits that 
converted to Catholicism found no reprieve from caste-based discrimination, as the social hierarchy is 
a strong feature in Indian Catholic communities. Also, as Christian conversion is heavily objected to, 
India has seen an increase in caste-related violence as a result.  
Dalit women face unique discrimination, separate from dalit discrimination as a whole. In traditional 
settings, women are treated as sex slaves and objects. In upwardly mobile settings they are responsible 
for maintaining the family’s elevated social status. Dalit women become controlled by their men, an 
imitation of upper caste traditions, and are victims of domestic violence.  
All of this research concludes that a true eradication of the practice of untouchability is impossible, 
without a complete reformation of India’s education system and Hindu society. This includes 
denouncing the caste system as the core of Indian society, and the encompassing beliefs of hierarchy. 
Only this will enable Dalits to live as equals.  
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Introduction 
Despite the practice of untouchability being abolished in 1950, Dalits continue to face daily social 
discrimination in India, due to issues with education and entrenched caste divisions. This thesis will 
focus on how and why the caste system continues to form the basis of Hindu society in India, with 
particular reference to how this affects the lives and treatments of India’s Dalits/ untouchables. It will 
explore the complexities surrounding the nature of caste and how all aspects of Indian society are 
affected and shaped by notions of caste and class divisions and hierarchy. It will establish ways in 
which Dalits have fought for social equality and justice, in the forms of conversion and women’s 
activism, and how successful their struggles have been. It will also analyse government attempts to 
close the gap in society that caste divisions have caused, by means of affirmative action. Furthermore, 
it will explore how entrenched caste notions of purity and untouchability are interwoven in all aspects 
of India, from the government to the grass-roots of society, which causes complexities in the fight for 
dalit social justice.  
 
Methodology 
This thesis has been researched and written using an interdisciplinary approach that has relied on text-
based research and insights, which have been analysed from a range of perspectives. I analysed 
sources from both a religious point of view and a political science perspective, and discovered the 
distinct symbiotic relationship between religion and politics in India, which has affected the social 
view of caste. As the caste system is at the heart of Hindu culture, this thesis also analysed sources 
from a cultural and social perspective, in order to gain insight into the effects caste discrimination has 
had on the relationship between castes and the inter-caste relationship between Dalits. As my research 
developed it became clear that all aspects of India life are connected and interlinked with each other 
e.g. religion, politics and the social structure of India are all intertwined. This is the reason I structured 
my thesis as a three-chapter compare and contrast between different social positions within the caste 
system and India’s hierarchical system, to establish how each position are reacting/ dealing with the 
social injustice that Dalits are facing.  
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A range of sources, both academic and non-academic, have been analysed and synthesised to form an 
original argument. Academic sources, from scholars such as Dirks, Jodhka, Deliege, etc., have been 
used to explore the theories and history of the caste system in India. I have also used academic 
secondary sources, such as scholarly journals that discuss and evaluate other scholars’ theories, as 
these are important for showing the progression of theories surrounding caste, from its vedic roots to 
the modern perception of caste that exists in contemporary India. Secondary academic sources also 
assist in establishing weaknesses in academic arguments. Primary sources, such as government 
statistics regarding the number of atrocities that have occurred against Dalits or the percentages of 
Dalits that have benefitted from A.A. policies, are extremely important as they show factual evidence 
of the current issues in India and also evidence of the progress that has been made in contemporary 
times.  
 
It is also important to note that I have made careful use of recent media reports, such as newspaper 
articles and television documentaries, as this thesis is concerned with the contemporary caste issues in 
India. There is also use of non-academic primary sources from particular perspectives, such as Hindu 
nationalists or religious converts, in order to compare a range of opinions. However, these sources 
have been treated with appropriate scrutiny, as opinion-based sources are always rooted in a biased 
perspective. As gender issues are one of the main topics covered in this thesis, the sources used have 
been written by a combination of both male and female authors, in order to prevent gender bias, as 
this thesis will cover both male and female dalit issues of discrimination. Naturally, a conscious effort 
has been made on my part to remain openminded; however, as with all academic writing, there is an 
inevitable bias. My perspective as a white, educated, western woman is reflected in my research. As a 
woman, I find the topic of female activism important and relatable. Also, as an educated western 
citizen, the empowerment of disenchanted groups is a very interesting topic. My identity as an 
educated, western woman is the reason that I chose this topic, in order to understand the vast 
difference between dalit experiences of social hierarchy and my own.  
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What is caste? 
It is very problematic to define exactly what the caste system is in India. Over 3000 years ago, vedic 
society was divided into the four classes of varna, a principle of identifying people according to their 
employment. Varna divided society into four classes: Brahmans (priests), Kṣatriyas (warriors), 
VaiĞyas (commoners) and ĝūdras (servants). This is illustrated in book 10 of Rg Veda, using the story 
of the sacrifice of the cosmic manŚ “When they divided Purusa how many portions did they make? 
What do they call his mouth, his arms? What do they call his thighs and feet? The Brahman was his 
mouth, of both his arms was the Kṣatriya made. His thighs became the VaiĞya, from his feet the Ğūdra 
was produced,” (Leaf, 2014, p.49). The Rg Veda is the earliest literary source of Hindu society, and 
there are no mentions of untouchables or anyone below Ğūdras in the varna  system. 
 
Another concept used equally frequently for exploring the origin of caste is Jāti. Jāti derives from the 
root meaning of birth. The two concepts of jāti and varna overlap in some ways but are distinctly 
different. Some scholars, such as A.A.MacDonell, argued that the basic division of caste was 
traditionally varna , and all Jātis are subdivisions of caste as the result of intermarriage between the 
four varnas (MacDonell, 1914, p.235). This idea is rooted in Manu, who stated that the jātis are the 
consequences of mixed marriages and the lowest jāti, the candāla, are born from the union of sūdra 
women with Brahmans (Manu, 10.16). Whilst there is no mention of untouchables in the varna 
system, perhaps the candāla jāti marked the beginnings of untouchability. In early Dharmashashtra 
texts, Cāndalas were sometimes categorised as Ğūdras, but a distinction between the two was 
established very soon (Singh, 2008, p.294). The cāndalas were the group of people in ancient Indian 
society that disposed of corpses. They were considered below the four varnas, a fifth class, viewed as 
both unclean and untouchable (Viswanath, 2014, p. 268). This is the first known case of the labelling 
of untouchability.  
 
Whilst the caste system that is present in Indian society today has roots in the ancient principles of 
varna and jāti, it has also evolved from constant changes to the economy, migration and by the 
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creation of new occupations. B.K Smith defined the caste system as “part of a larger ‘chain of being’, 
fitting into a cosmical hierarchy in which various categories (Jāti) are arranged in varying degrees of 
subtlety and purity,” (Smith, 1994, pp. 27-28). On the other hand, scholars such as Dirks argue that 
the modern understanding of the caste system, identifying and absorbing India’s diverse social 
identities into one system, is a British invention (Dirks, 2001). Dirks believes that caste is a modern 
phenomenon, rather than a basic expression of Indian tradition, that is a product of the encounter 
between India and British colonial rule. There are regional variations to caste and the nature of the 
caste system is forever shifting, making it tricky to identify a unified understanding of caste. Despite 
the complexity surrounding the roots of the caste system, it is now an integral part of Indian society. 
Gavin Flood identified four characteristics to the caste system: 
1) Hierarchical structure in any region, with the Brahmans at the top, the untouchables at the 
bottom. Between these are a wide array of other castes. 
2) The caste hierarchy is based on the polarity between purity and pollution, the Brahmans 
being the most pure, the untouchables the most impure. 
3) The caste of any individual is inalienable; it is a property of the body and cannot be 
removed (except according to some traditions by initiation). 
4) There are strict rules of caste endogamy and commensality. (Flood, 2010, p.59)  
These characteristics begin to show the restrictions that are placed upon Hindu society, but this thesis 
will focus on the treatment of untouchables/Dalits. By examining these characteristics, it is evident 
that Dalits are considered to belong at the bottom of the social order, are believed to be polluted and 
impure, are expected to marry only between their fellow untouchables, and have no way of 
escaping/removing this fate. From here, the beginnings of dalit discrimination and the poor treatment 
that they have suffered and continue to suffer, can be acknowledged. 
 
Theories and myths about the origin of Dalits and their untouchability 
As the development of the caste system has been outlined above, it is now time to focus on the origin 
of Dalits. There are several terms used in India to describe the ‘polluted’ caste. ‘Untouchable’ is not a 
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term often used in India, as untouchability was officially outlawed in 1949. Paraiyar is another term 
sometimes used to describe untouchables. Paraiyars were originally a caste group from Tamil Nadu, 
who took up ‘unclean’ occupations, such as corpse burial and scavenging. In contemporary India, 
Paraiyar is not a name used to describe an untouchable from any caste. Mahatma Gandhi used the 
term ‘Harijans’, meaning God’s children, but most Dalits have rejected this term as it is considered 
“derogative and insulting,” (The Hindu, 2003). The official name used in India is cheduled castes, as 
this is how the government identify minorities that qualify for reservation, along with Tribals and 
other backward castes (this will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter). This thesis will use 
the term ‘Dalit’, as it is a self-identifying term, meaning oppressed or broken.  
 
Dalits being considered as untouchable is centred around the notion of impurity. The Cāndala Jāti 
mentioned earlier are an example of this, as their contact with corpses is what identifies them as 
impure. Although there is no definite proof of when the notion of purity and impurity began, Dalits 
believe in several myths to explain the creation of their caste. One of these myths was recorded by 
Thurston in 1909:  
There were 2 brothers who were poor. They went together to pray to God. God asked them to 
remove the carcass of a dead cow. The elder brother answered “Een thambi pappA.A.n,” (my 
younger brother will do it), but understood “Een thambi pA.A.ppA.A.n” (my brother is a 
Brahman); since that day the younger brother became a brahman and the elder brother a 
paraiyar. All castes originate from these two brothers. (Thurston, 1909, p.84) 
 
This myth illustrates that, up until direct contact with the polluted carcass, both brothers were equal. It 
is also shows that it is not a dalit’s fault or choice to be a dalit, which suggests the disdain and blame 
against Dalits by upper castes is unfair. The characteristics of the caste system prevent Dalits from 
escaping the ‘pollution’ which makes them untouchable, and yet they are punished for an existence 
they cannot change. Guru explains this injustice in a succinct and detailed manner:  
“The ideology of purity- pollution, which is the core of Brahmanism, forces Dalits to carry 
with them all the time a morally degrading meaning, even if some of them have moved out of 
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defiling jobs such as scavenging and other sanitary work. Those Dalits who still find 
themselves chained to the obnoxious job of manual scavenging and rag picking continue to 
remain repulsive objects of intolerance. The touchable caste pushes Dalits first into 
degraded/inhuman forms of jobs, then uses the same dislocation and stigmatizes them. Thus, 
the upper castes invent justification for their intolerance of Dalits. This burden of stigma 
remains attached to Dalits across time and space. The ideology of Brahmanism thus turns 
Dalits into a walking carcass or mobile dirt, and their colonies into stigmatised ghettos that 
look almost similar to the apartheid that existed in South Africa.” (Guru, 2016) 
 
These theories and arguments suggest that it is the Brahmins and higher castes that ensure the survival 
of the caste system in India. Louis Dumont theorised that hierarchy is the essence of caste, and it is 
focussed on the superiority of the pure over the impure. The Germain sociologist, Max Weber, agreed 
with Dumont on the caste focus over hierarchy. He viewed the caste system as an extreme case of 
status groups found in all areas of society, and that the caste system was rigid and unchanging 
(Weber, 2009, p.406). J, P. Mencher agreed with this theory, arguing that the caste system “functions 
as a very effective system of economic exploitation,” (Mencher, 1974, p.469). This exploitation can 
be seen in different ways throughout the entirety of India. 
 
However, in later years, scholars have challenged these theories and argued for the changing nature of 
caste society. This can be seen in arguments set forth by scholars such as Nicholas Dirks, who argued 
that the existence of the modern-day caste systems that exists today is the result of British 
colonisation, and it is vastly different to the caste system that existed pre-colonisation. This theory 
was named ‘caste as India tradition’ by Surinder Jodhka, who described that, although varna/Jāti 
social divisions existed, including the practice of pollution and untouchability, the modern-day 
theorisation of caste as it is practised today began when the British colonised India. This is an 
extension of Dirks’ theory, who believed that the British perceived caste as “a local form of civil 
society, which was responsible to India’s political weakness and symptom of the over-development of 
its religion pre-occupations,” (Dirks, 2001, p.40). I disagree with Dirks’ view that the caste system is 
13 
 
a British colonial invention, as it pre-existed colonialism still as a central feature of Hindu society, but 
rather suggest that colonialism solidified the caste divisions into the caste system that is known and 
used in India today. The British solidified the distinctions between caste when they made a census of 
India, in an attempt to classify the entire population by casteŚ “systematic ethnography effectively 
began in 1871, when the first national census of India was carried out. Indian census included 
questions about caste membership,” (Fuller, 2010, p.72). They worked on the assumption that 
everyone in India belongs to a caste and that castes were real identifiable groups (Sharma, 2002, p.8). 
Before colonialism, the lines between caste were a lot more flexible, but caste still existed in Indian 
society. These changes to the caste system throughout history highlights that the system is constantly 
evolving due to the different impacting factors in India society.  
 
What influences the caste system and how does it directly affect the treatment of Dalits 
As the caste system forms the foundation of Hindu society, its practices and beliefs are woven into 
every aspect of everyday life. Education and employment is affected by caste. It has been established 
that untouchability was created by upper castes. Now the question must be asked of how do upper 
castes keep control of Dalits? What affects the daily lives of Dalits in contemporary India?  
1) Location 
Location is India is very important when examining the daily lives and treatment of Dalits. As the 7th 
largest country in the world, with a population of over 1.2 billion people, there are many variations of 
cultures and beliefs (WorldAtlaS.C.om, 2017). Culture is often regionally diverse, with each state 
having its own laws, as well as enforcing the laws created by the country’s government as a whole. 
There are also cultural differences between North and South India, in relation to Dalits. There is more 
religion-related violence occurring in North India, as conversion to Buddhism and also Christianity is 
more popular in North Indian than South India. However, dalit political parties are more prominent in 
South India, and the upward social mobility of dalit communities occurs more frequently in villages in 
South India.  
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As well as differences between North and south India, there are also variations in the circumstances of 
rural vs. urban Dalits. In rural areas, Dalits often live in mud huts in small communities on the 
outskirts of villages. They are often socially and physically isolated, living miles away from access to 
medical care and other immunities. Rural Dalits tend to be dependent on upper castes, as they are 
usually indebted to them as landlords or employers (Dalitsolidarity.com, 2017). In contrast, urban 
Dalits in the cities commonly live in overcrowded slums. These are also terrible living conditions, 
with around a million residents crammed into one square mile. There are extremely high risks of 
disease in city slums. Various diseases are associated with the exposure of unsanitary conditions in 
slum areas, such as malaria and typhoid fever (Praharaj, 2013).  
2) Police and local government 
Police casteism is another problem for Dalits in contemporary India. In 2016, Kanch Iliaiah stated 
“our police carry their caste with them: even when they are on duty they practice discrimination,” 
(The Quint, 2016). Even the former Maharashtra director general of police confirmed “there were 
instances where the police discriminated against people from the lower castes. The P.O.A. (Prevention 
of Atrocities) act is of a little help,” (the Quint, 2016). This makes it difficult for Dalits to fight for 
social justice, if they do not have a judgement-free police system to report caste-related incidents to.  
3) Politics 
Whilst India gained independence in 1947 and quickly formed the Indian constitution, which 
abolished the practice of untouchability, there are still many issues in politics that assist the 
continuation of caste discrimination. The Bharatiya Janata Party (B.J.P.), a right-wing nationalist 
party led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, are currently in government. The B.J.P. is also associated 
with the Rāṣṭrīya Svayamsēvaka Saṅgha (R.S.S.), a Hindu nationalist volunteer organisation who 
endorse the Hindutva (Hindu-ness) ideology. The R.S.S. and the B.J.P. have attempted to harmonise 
Phule-Ambedkar dalit equality thought with Hindutva philosophy, by establishing the Samajik 
Samrasta Manch (social harmony platform). The objective of this campaign was to integrate Dalits 
into Hindu society, which was highly important for the B.J.P., in order to enlarge their support base 
by gaining dalit votes (Gupta, 2016). However, they wish to integrate Dalits into society without 
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upsetting the hierarchy of the caste system. This is unacceptable to assertive Dalits, who believe that 
traditional Hinduism is the reason for their low social status.  
4) Education 
Education is one of the biggest problems that Dalits face in contemporary India. In rural areas, many 
Dalits are illiterate, which leads to less employment opportunities and a lack of understanding their 
own rights. Although the government has made provisions to help educate Dalits it has been met with 
considerable resistanceŚ “The project of educating the low castes may have met with resistance from 
the upper castes who feared that such a project and consequent upward mobility of the lower castes 
would jeopardise the control and management of their low caste worker, dependents and servants,” 
(Tharamangalam, 2012). 
 
India holds a ‘free and compulsory’ education act, stating that every child receives free education 
between the ages of 6 and 14. Unfortunately that does not ensure that every child receives the same 
standard of education. In some schools, students are made to wear colour-coded wrist bands to 
identify which caste they belong to (Marszal, 2015). It is also common for dalit children to be forced 
to sit outside the classroom, away from the other children (Coudere, 2016). This will automatically 
affect a child’s ability to learn, as they cannot interact with the rest of the class and have limited 
access to resources. It has also been recorded that dalit children are sent out during lesson time to 
clean the school toilets, which results in them missing out on class time (Mukulli, 2009).  
The standard of living for a dalit also has an impact on a dalit child’s education. As shown in the 
previous paragraph, many Dalits, particularly those who live in rural areas, live miles away from 
school. This also increases their social isolation from the rest of their community, setting them at a 
disadvantage.  
5) Employment 
Dalit children get forced into labour, as their families need the money to survive. Siddharth Kara, the 
director of the Carr Centre program on human trafficking and modern slavery at Harvard University, 
has estimated that ten to thirty million children are forced to work in India, to help their families to 
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survive. The most common fields children are found in include leather processing, sewage cleaning 
and refuse scavenging, which are all traditionally associated with Dalits and the lowest castes (Kara, 
quoted in Dominguez, 2014). 
 
These jobs are not only specifically occupied by dalit children. Dalit men are forced to go down to the 
sewers without protective gear. In Tamil Nadu, more than 200 dalit men have died from toxic gases 
when descending to clean sewers (The Hindu, 2016). Many Dalits are forced to continue in these 
repugnant jobs and receive social ostracism as their thanks (Harriss- White and Rodrigo, 2015). 
 
These aspects of Indian society and dalit life will be seen as regularly themes throughout this thesis. 
The first chapter will be focused on the government attempts to combat discrimination against Dalits 
by way of affirmative action policies. The second chapter will analyse the success of religious 
conversion as a means of escaping caste discrimination. The final chapter will examine the unique 
struggle of dalit women and the steps they have taken to improve their social situation. The 
conclusion will focus on comparing the results of each chapter, to establish whether there is a solution 
to be found for the poor treatment and social discrimination that Dalits face on a daily basis.  
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Chapter 1 
Affirmative Action: Its strengths and challenges 
 
This chapter is focussed on affirmative action and the impact it has had on the treatment of Dalits in 
India. It will examine the history and concept of affirmative action in India, and compare it to 
affirmative action in the United States, in order to establish weaknesses within A.A. in general, and to 
compare if it has seen more success in western culture than eastern. It will deal with problems of poor 
implementation and discuss how a minority label can potentially cause more problems than it solves. 
This chapter will then explore how the education system is affected by affirmative action, and 
establish that although affirmative action is flawed, it can help provide Dalits with a platform to voice 
their own rights. Furthermore, this chapter will deal with the success and failures of quotas in India, 
and discuss the possibility of Hinduism and affirmative action working harmoniously. Finally, this 
chapter will attempt to illustrate how affirmative action is just one element of a much bigger plan that 
will be needed in order to eliminate untouchability in Indian society, as it is currently being used to 
cloak the real issues of caste discrimination and how to solve them. 
 
What is affirmative action? 
Affirmative action is a “phrase that refers to attempts to bring members of underrepresented groups, 
usually groups that have suffered discrimination, into a higher degree of participation in some 
beneficial program. Some affirmative action efforts include preferential treatment; others do not,” 
(Greenawalt, 1983, p.17). In India, affirmative action is class-based, focussing on overcoming the 
discrimination against Dalits and other backward castes. This is different to the U.S., as their 
affirmative actions are focussed on overcoming race based discrimination. Unfortunately, affirmative 
action is often accused of increasing the awareness of class and racial identities, which can lead to 
further entrenching class divisions, rather than extinguishing them. Despite the difference between 
American and Indian affirmative action, there are many ways in which the policies could learn from 
each other, in both strengths and weaknesses. The theory behind affirmative action can only be 
viewed as positive, as the intention is to eliminate discrimination and to help the people who have 
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previously been discriminated against. In reality, though, many flaws have been found within the 
implementation of Affirmative action (A.A.), which have led to suggestions of extinguishing A.A. 
policies. The main problem with these arguments is that they do not necessarily produce an alternative 
theory or action, meaning that eliminating A.A. would simply result in the discrimination remaining. 
 
Affirmative action in India began in a similar way to how it was formed in the United States. When 
India regained independence in 1947, the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Indian 
constitution drafted an affirmative action policy, which was contained in article 46. It stated that “the 
state shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of 
the people and in particular the scheduled castes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all 
forms of exploitation,” (legalIndia.com, 2016). The new constitution recognised that “untouchables 
and tribals deserved special provisions and provides a legal basis for reservation of seats in the 
governments for these ‘deserving’ groups,” (Chatterji, 1996, p.296). 
 
The Roots of Affirmative Action and its application in India 
The beginnings of A.A. could be seen long before India gained its independence. In 1902, the 
Maharajah Shahu introduced reservation in some degree. He provided free education to all in his state 
and ensured suitable employment for students. He also appealed for the abolition of untouchability 
(B.S.P.India.org, 2017).  
 
During the British raj, other elements of reservation emerged. In 1932, at the round table conference, 
the Communal Award was announced, providing separate representation for Muslims, Sikhs, Indian 
Christians, Anglo-Indians, and Europeans. This caused controversy, as Gandhi fasted in protest 
against it whilst the dalit leader, Dr Ambedkar, favoured the Communal Award. They eventually 
reached an agreement where Ambedkar could have a single Hindu electorate, with Dalits having seats 
reserved within it. But electorates for other religions remained separate. The agreement between 
Ambedkar and Gandhi became known as the Poona Pact (Menon, 2015, p.49).  
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Now, affirmative action is made up of reservation quotas in both employment and education. This was 
created to ensure that SC (Scheduled castes/ Dalits) and ST (scheduled tribes) would have some 
degree of access to jobs and education. Quotas in higher education are as follows: 15% reserved for 
SC and 7.4% reserved for STs for both undergraduate and post-graduate courses. In 2006, via the 93rd 
constitutional amendment, a mandatory quota of 27% was introduced for other backward castes 
(O.B.C.) for higher education also. The quotas in employment are a little less straightforward. In the 
public sector, jobs are classified into 4 types: class 1 is the highest paid job, and includes jobs such as 
the officers of the Indian administrative service (I.A.S.), Indian foreign service (I.F.S.), Indian police 
service and other related central-government services. Class 2 employees are officers of the state 
civil-service cadre. Both classes 1 and 2 jobs are filled through competitive examinations and 
interviews. Classes 3 and 4 consist of low skill and low qualification jobs. These also provide the 
lowest income and form the majority of government employment (Deshpande, 2013, pp.86-87).  
 
Posts are reserved for SCs, STs and O.B.C.s in all four classes via direct recruitment. When 
recruitment is at national level by open competition, e.g. union public service commission, the 
reservation for SC is 15%, for ST is 7.5% and O.B.C. is 27%. But if the recruitment is not through 
open competition, the quotas change to 16.6% for SC, 7.5% for ST and 25.84% for O.B.C. For class 3 
and 4 jobs, that attract mainly local applicants, the percentage of reserved seats is fixed in proportion 
to the SC-ST population in that given area, and for O.B.C.s the quota is fixed to not exceed 27% 
(Deshpande, 2013, p.86). 
 
The implementation of quotas has improved over time. For class 1 jobs, between 1964-1984, the share 
of SCs increased from 1.6% to 7%. Between 1994-2004 a sharper increase could be seen. SC share 
became 12.2% by the end of 2004. These statistics provide an initial impression that A.A. policies 
have been successful in providing Dalits equal access or opportunities within employment that would 
not have been easily accessible before. Sheth argues that this reflected the aftermath of the Mandal 
commission, which created the space for a greater assertion of Dalit or low-caste activism, one 
consequence of which was the better implementation of quotas (Sheth, 2004, p.13). Before the 1990s, 
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for years quotas remained unfulfilled. Galanter believed that this could be attributed to 
“indifference/hostility on the part of the appointing authorities, insufficient publicization of vacancies 
and the sheer expense of application,” (Galanter, 1984, p.97). 
 
The problem of O.B.C. 
O.B.C. is perhaps the category that has brought the most controversy towards affirmative action. This 
is mainly because it is difficult to determine who qualifies as a ‘lower represented’ group. In India this 
is difficult, as there are many different categories of caste and backward castes. It was finally decided 
with the introduction of the Mandal commission that SC (Dalits), ST and O.B.C. (Such as Muslims 
and Christians) should be granted reservation, although it was never officially decided what defines a 
person/ community as O.B.C. (Chatterji, 1996, p.304). This shows a distinct weakness in the theory 
and implementation of A.A. in India, as the government has created no clear guidelines as to who is 
and isn’t eligible for A.A. This results in caste communities attempting to gain the O.B.C. status, in 
order to gain access to reservations. This, in turn, is taking away opportunities from minorities that 
really need the assistance of reservation quotas to find employment. 
 
The lack of guidelines over eligibility in A.A. policies has also created issues within the United States. 
Although the Civil Rights movement was created initially to end racial segregation and discrimination 
against African Americans and to ensure protection of their citizenship rights, it did not stop there. As 
discussed by Terry Eastland, the major problem that is caused by A.A. in America is the fact that the 
programs are indifferent to whether or not the claimants are U.S. citizens or not. He stated that 75% of 
people who come to the U.S. are of an ethnic background, which makes them automatically eligible 
for A.A., regardless of the citizenship status and how recently they arrived in the country. This allows 
immigrants that have no past experience of discrimination by the U.S. to reap rewards or special help 
that should be reserved for those who have been previously discriminated against (Eastland, 1997, 
p.17). This shows that in order for A.A. to be successful in aiding the citizens that need help, and to 
prevent other communities from taking advantage of reservations, distinct guidelines and rules over 
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There are numerous examples in India of castes fighting for legal recognition as ‘backwards’, in order 
to access the advantages of government quotas. In 2015 there was a protest movement aimed at 
declaring the Patidar community as ‘backwards’. Patidars are a politically dominant section of 
Gujarati society, and known as key players in the Indian diamond trade. Therefore, they are not a 
community that would traditionally be named ‘oppressed’, but a backwards status would still give the 
Patidars access to 50% of government jobs and places in education that are currently reserved for 
‘backward’ castes under affirmative action (Iyengar, 2015). Jaffrelot pointed out another group 
fighting for the backward status- the Jātis. Jātis are an agricultural caste group in Haryana, and spread 
across seven other states in North India. They have been fighting for the ‘backward’ label since the 
Gurnham Singh report in 1991 favoured their inclusion on the list of O.B.C.s. This protest has been 
used as a political advantage by the B.J.P., who promised the Jātis a reclassification of O.B.C.s if the 
B.J.P. were voted to power (Jaffrelot, 2011, p.441). To this day, there are still not recognised as a 
‘backward’ class. These are just two examples of many groups who wish to considered as ‘backward’. 
Raman also points out a case where the label of backward class was considered so valuable in India 
that over 100 people were killed. In Nagpur, 1994, a printing error resulted in the Gowari tribe from 
being left off the list of O.B.C. on affirmative action scrolls. As a result, the Gowari believed they 
were not being given the status of ‘backward’, and 40,000 of them mobbed the statehouse in a riot 
(Raman, 1999, p.30). All of this evidence confirms that it is imperative that distinct restrictions need 
to be put in place to establish a cohesive set of guidelines stating who is eligible for government 
quotas, in order to prevent the controversy and violent retaliations that are occurring over A.A. 
eligibility in India.  
 
Identities and labelling 
The lack of differentiation between who does and does not qualify for a minority status is a problem, 
as it has been used by A.A. opposition to suggest that A.A. is ‘reverse discrimination’. This is the 
term used to describe how affirmative action can supply so many rights to minorities that they end up 
becoming the privileged, and the ‘elite’ citizens then become the ones subjected to discrimination. 
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This argument has been used to suggest that affirmative action can never successfully create equality, 
as it will always favour a certain group of people. However, in the case of India, this argument is 
incorrect. There has been no evidence found that shows that A.A. has enabled Dalits to become more 
elite than other castes. In fact, evidence analysed throughout this chapter highlights that, in many 
cases, the existence of A.A. has served to increase caste divisions and dalit discrimination. The 
argument that A.A. is ‘reverse discrimination’ could arguably be an excuse given by higher castes 
who do not want minorities to gain access to employment and education, and wish the discrimination 
against Dalits to continue. This idea has been considered by Prue Burns, who argued that ‘reverse 
discrimination’ has been used by opposition who wish to “deny or bury the positive intentions of 
affirmative action,” (Burns, 2008, p.372). Higher castes are using the argument of ‘reverse 
discrimination’ as an excuse to perpetuate discrimination. As shown throughout this chapter, A.A. is 
India has been proven to entrench the caste identities by targeting a select section of people. In this 
way, affirmative action and quotas can never eradicate the caste system. 
 
Whilst majority groups are arguing that A.A. is providing ‘special treatment’ to minorities, there are 
also cases where minorities also dislike A.A. for the ‘labelling’ aspect that it entails. In many areas, 
drawing attention to the dalit identity of a person causes them to fear the increased likelihood of 
discrimination against them. Examples can be seen even in India’s capital, Delhi, where it is common 
for dalit students to hide their identities and avoid telling people their surnames, as it often results in 
shunning and even violence. One case of this was recorded in 2008, where a female MPhil student 
studying Hindi literature was denied water for three days by her landlord and wife before being 
physically attacked, because they discovered that she was a dalit (Sengupta, 2008). In the article, the 
student states that Dalits know they must hide their identities from people otherwise they know they 
will not receive help or be welcomed anywhere (Sengupta, 2008). It has also been the case in the past 
where Dalits have invented fictional surnames to hide their identities, such as Sumit Baudh. He 
refused to apply for university under the ‘reserved’ category, and instead he and his father invented 
him a new surname, Nimbekar. This was a combination of his family’s gotra, Nimb, and a salute to 
Dr. Ambedkar (Baudh, 2016). These are just a few examples of many cases that have occurred and 
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still continue to exist. Dr. Ambedkar argued that drawing attention to dalit identity is a good thing, as 
it must be strengthened in the short-term to allow caste to be eliminated in the long-term. However, 
this argument has been disputed by Andre Beteille, who believed that A.A. only serves to strengthen 
caste identity, which is harmful to those of the lowest and backward castes (Ashalatha, 2014, p.151).  
 
Also, in higher education, many beneficiaries of affirmative action programs believe that it makes 
them look ‘incompetent’ compared to students from other castes. A recent BBC article highlighted 
how students are subjected to shaming and mocked as being ‘quota students’. A PhD student, Rohith 
Vemula, committed suicide after being shamed for gaining entry through reservations. The article also 
notes the absence of student support groups for reservation students, which results in warning signals 
of suffering students G.O.I.ng unnoticed or being ignored (Biswas, 2016). Beneficiaries of affirmative 
action suffer from stigma, further linked to the argument that A.A. disregards a person’s merit. It is 
often believed that reservations result in candidates having access to preferred positions in higher 
education and employment, over others who are better qualified or ‘have earned’ the position. This 
argument can be disputed, as it is very difficult to measure a person’s merit and efficiencyŚ “Just as it 
is argued that caste-based quotas are an impressive or rough measure to target ‘true’ deprivation, 
exam scores could be seen as an imprecise or rough measure of underlying ‘merit’” (Deshpande, 
2013, p.147). If there is a higher caste student with outstanding examination scores, and a dalit that 
would fill the quota of reservation, who should be given the opportunity? This is the argument given 
by affirmative action opposition and, whilst correct, it fails to identity the true problem. The real 
problem lies with the inequality of education between castes, and the number of spaces available in 
higher education. 
 
Affirmative action and education 
As identified in the introduction of this thesis, dalit children do not receive the same standard of 
education as children of other castes, and are treated in a discriminatory fashion throughout their 
schooling. This impacts the children’s ability to learn and grow equally. The standard of living for a 
dalit also has an impact on a dalit child’s education. Many Dalits are unable to send their children to 
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school because their families need their labour in order to earn enough money to survive. Examples of 
these circumstances can be seen in numerous journal and newspaper articles. Siddharth Kara, the 
director on human trafficking and modern slavery at Harvard’s University, has estimated that ten to 
thirty million children are forced to work in India, to help their families survive. The most common 
fields children are found in include leather processing, sewage cleaning and refuse scavenging, which 
are all traditionally associated with Dalits and the lowest castes (Dominguez, 2014). A village study in 
Karnataka also showed that 96% of dalit families are located near the boundaries of villages or are 
isolated entirely from the village community (timesofindia.com, 2012). The physical distance between 
the children’s homes and the school (often located at the centre of the village) is commonly too far to 
walk each day, resulting in low attendance or even no attendance. The psychological separation also 
means that children do not benefit from interacting with other children and become socially isolated. 
None of these aspects of a dalit’s life are created by Dalits themselves, and they have no control over 
them. Therefore, only by dealing with these problems can it be fair to argue a position of ‘merit’. As 
Nussbaum pointed out, “a test that purports to be a neutral measure of intelligence is full of pitfalls for 
the child of a minority or immigrant culture or of a less than stimulating home environment,” 
(Nussbaum, 2012, p.81).  
 
These points also disprove the argument that reservations are wasted on Dalits, due to the high drop-
out rates in higher education. It is argued that the places should be given to general students who are 
more able to complete the demanding courses, rather than Dalits who have little chance of success due 
to poor preparation. But, as already stated above, the reason Dalits have little chance to prepare for 
higher education is through no fault of their own. If they were given completely equal rights and 
standard of living and socialising as other higher castes, they would have more of a chance to survive 
and thrive in higher education. A perfect analogy of this was given by Lyndon Johnson in 1965Ś “You 
do not take a person who has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting 
line of a race and say ‘you are free to compete with all the others’, and still justly believe that you 
have been completely fair,” (Robinson, 2006, p.21). This quote also indicates that affirmative action is 
not sufficient on its own to rid India of its deep societal inequalities. Even when education spaces are 
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given to Dalits, society still lashes out and begrudges the opportunities that Dalits are given. All of the 
problems that Dalits face stem from society viewing them as polluted and, therefore, unworthy. Until 
that view is changed or dealt with, Dalits will continue to be oppressed, even with affirmative action 
in place.  
 
Affirmative action in the U.S. underwent, and overcame, a similar problem regarding equality in 
education. In 1954, there was a supreme court case of Brown Vs. the board of education. Black 
citizens were petitioning for the rights of same education and resources for their children as their 
white neighbours had. Mississippi senator James Eastland’s view could be argued to be very similar 
to those of higher caste IndiansŚ “School integration is something that the white race will not permit 
under any conditions; and there is not the power of compulsion on the part of the federal government 
to compel it,” (Robinson, J. 2006, p.19). Untouchability has been outlawed for over fifty years in 
India and yet Dalits are still being discriminated against on a daily basis. The reason for this is 
because the quality between all Indian citizens is not what the entire society wants. Affirmative action 
will never work if the local authorities and other members in each society do not want it to work.  
 
Affirmative action and the abolition of discrimination is a constant battle in India. An example of this 
can be seen in Delhi university, where the professors opposed the introductions of quotas, even 
though it is a constitutional provision. As a result of this, the reservations were introduced as late as 
1996. Delhi university also opposed the employment quotas. The Xaxa reports in 2002 highlighted 
that, out of 700 lecturers in postgraduate departments, only 7 of these were Dalits. Also, out of 4512 
teachers in affiliated under-graduate colleges, 11 of them were SCs (Xaxa, 2002). Non-teaching posts 
in Delhi university conform to the typical pattern that can be seen all over India: the higher the 
representation of SC, the lower paying the job. It is common that menial and low paying jobs are  
most often performed almost exclusively by Dalits and low-caste (Deshpande, 2013, p.90).  
 
Deshpande also raises the interesting point that, in all of the opposition to affirmative action, there is 
never a protest against over-representation of low caste in low paying jobs. This leaves the impression 
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that, as long as Dalits do not compete for the traditional upper-caste jobs, then it is considered 
acceptable (Deshpande, 2013, p.90). In 2006, Delhi University set up an ‘equal opportunity cell’, 
focussed towards physical access for disabled students and ‘the implementation of affirmative action 
towards SC, ST and O.B.C.’. However, no activities in the last three years have indicated any specific 
attempts to ensure the enforcement of affirmative action (Deshpande, 2013, p.90). Since then, the 
university have now changed their equal opportunity cell to focus on the issues related to students 
belonging to SC, ST and O.B.C. and disabled students on a continual basis (Delhi University, 2017). 
There are also constant barriers being displayed in employment, in regards to quotas. Guhan points 
out that these procedures include temporary positions given to Dalits, so they can easily be taken 
away, and eliminations via personal evaluation procedures (Guhan, 2001, p.213). 
 
As common as the arguments against affirmative action are, it is important to note that these 
arguments are not always accurate. There have been cases of non-Dalits fighting for equal rights for 
all caste members, particularly in education. They have argued that the answer lies not with 
abandoning reservations, but increasing efforts to address the educational inequality that occurs at a 
much younger age (as discussed earlier). They believe that unless there is a huge commitment to 
improving the primary school education, India cannot expect reservations to succeed (Deshpande, 
2013, p.121). 
 
A further reason why Dalits need the higher education that affirmative action provides is because it 
gives them a ‘voice’. “It allows them to go to the centre of society, where they can meet other people 
and get a platform,” (Deshpande and Newman, 2007). Deshpande also highlights that:  
 
the silence imposed by marginality, caste prejudice and poverty is broken by introducing 
these dalit students to another world and a different future. These opportunities promote 
social mobility because reservations literally rescue Dalits from a lifetime of exploitation at 
the hands of landlords, employers and neighbours who can turn on them without provocation 
and remind them forcefully of their subordinate status (2013, p.118). 
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 This is a further argument for how some believe that only true change will occur when Dalits find 
their own voices and, although they need to have a platform provided for them to speak for 
themselves, the inner fight for equality still needs to come from dalit activism in order for 
discrimination to truly be dealt with. All of these arguments and criticisms of affirmative action are 
showing that affirmative action is not enough on its own.  
 
Affirmative action quotas 
A difference that can be seen between affirmative action in India and the U.S. is the focus on quotas. 
In India, affirmative action is implemented by way of quotas in higher education and employment 
sectors. Sheth argued that these quotas were moderately successful due to the Mandal Commission, as 
it created the space for a greater assertion of dalit activism, which consequently resulted in better 
implementation of quotas and reservations (Sheth, 2004, p.13). The increase of SC in class 1 jobs is 
evident; in 1964, only 1.6% were held by SC, but by the end of 2004 it had risen to 12.2% 
(Deshpande, 2013, p.87). But, on further investigation, it is the quotas and reservations that are 
criticised and seen as the reason why affirmative action will never work. Deshpande highlights how 
quotas can be criticised for failing to promote equality, as by reserving for one set of people, that 
space is denied to others:  
Quotas are widely seen as unfair, and are condemned for punishing innocent upper castes for 
the damage done in the past, and for reinforcing caste lines rather than striving for a caste-free 
society, and for exempting Dalits from the rigours of market competition. Critics argue that 
reservations replace one form of discrimination (against Dalits) with another, equally 
pernicious form (against non-quota students and workers). (2013, p.115) 
 
 However, there are other scholars who completely disagree with this reasoning. Shaw believes that 
people fight to eliminate affirmative action because it removes the advantages they are used to having: 
“Only because they stand to gain so much from past discrimination do they stand to lose from 
affirmative action,” (Shaw, 1988, p.766). It is felt that these people would rather continue 
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discriminating against Dalits, for fear of losing out on a privilege that they may not necessarily should 
have had in the first place. If India was completely equal in all aspects, then any privileges would 
have to be earnt, and the opportunities to earn those privileges would be open to all e.g. higher wages 
when promoted.  
 
Affirmative action and Hinduism 
One impact on affirmative action that must be looked at is religion. As this thesis is focussed on the 
treatment of Hindu Dalits in India, the role of Hinduism in India and how it affects society must be 
examined. Thiemann (1996) has argued that religion should be kept separate from ideas of freedom 
and equality, as it can cause more problems and draws society away from reason. In India, it is 
impossible to do this when discussing society, as it is built upon the Hindu hierarchy of the caste 
system. As this is the case, could it ever be possible for affirmative action to be successful? 
Affirmative action is aimed at bridging the gaps between different people, which distances from 
traditional caste thinking of a hierarchical structure to society. Unlike typically western views, Hindus 
do not traditionally believe in the equality of all people, and the idea of pollution from Dalits is 
heavily entrenched.  
 
Sharma has attempted to address this issue. Sharma argues that not only can Hinduism fit side by side 
with affirmative action, but can also be used as an argument for affirmative action (Sharma, 2005, 
p.47). His argument begins by exploring the Hindu notion of karma and rebirth, and examining 
whether affirmative action could be argued as a result of good karma, by remaining faithful to their 
religion even when they are being discriminated against (Sharma, 2005, p.49). The problem with this 
argument is that karma affects everyone; stating that Dalits deserve to be given reservations is 
implying that the higher castes deserve to have these places taken from them, which further implies 
that the higher castes have bad karma. Equally, karma is an individualistic design. If a Hindu created 
good karma for his/herself in their lifetime, it will lead to a better rebirth in the next life. Affirmative 
action is focussed on rights of a particular group of people, not one person individually. In this way, 
karma and affirmative action do not work together.  
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On the other hand, as karma is linked to rebirth, it could be used to answer the question of why should 
someone be compensated for how their ancestors suffered? Since untouchability has been outlawed in 
India, many argue that dalit discrimination does not exist, and is a thing of the past. But, when linked 
to karma, it could be argued that these people deserve to be compensated because they are the same 
people that were discriminated against in a previous life. In this way, the compensation through 
affirmative action could be construed as the consequence of good karma. However, the problem with 
this argument is that karma could be used to justify almost anything in this sense. Hindus that 
discriminate against Dalits could argue that it is karma for their poor actions in a previous life, and 
now they are being punished for those actions. Therefore, perhaps karma is too vague an idea to be 
used to justify discrimination or affirmative action. Sharma’s arguments show that karma and rebirth 
can perhaps serve as a religious resource for affirmative action, albeit a weak argument in itself, but it 
is not a strong enough argument on its own for affirmative action (Sharma, 2005, p.59). 
 
Sharma moves on to discuss how the Upanishads can be used to back up arguments for affirmative 
action. In the Isha Upanishad it stated that “The Lord is enshrined in the hearts of all. The Lord is the 
supreme reality. Rejoice in him through renunciation. Covet nothing,” (The Upanishads, 1987, p.208). 
Sharma believed this justifies affirmative action as enjoyment and success in life does not come from 
holding on to things that belong to others. By this, Sharma is referring to how Dalits are forbidden 
from having access to certain things such as water, and not being allowed to have equal opportunities 
in jobs and education. Whilst people argue that scheduled castes and other backward classes are being 
provided more opportunities than ever before, Sharma responds that it also goes hand in hand with the 
upper castes having better opportunities of study and employment than ever before. Sharma states this 
in conjunction with his previous quotes of not coveting what belongs to others and finding enjoyment 
in renunciation. For upper castes to find joy, he argues they should renounce their claim to every job 
and educational opportunity, as they are not giving up anything when allowing Dalits to have 
reservations. He also believes that, whilst dalit opportunities may be getting stronger, the higher castes 
still hold the majority of the power and opportunities, and are not giving up anything. This argument 
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is not particularly accurate; with reservations negating the concept of “equal opportunity”, as seats are 
only reserved for certain castes, it can not be adequately argued that upper castes have more 
opportunities than ever before. Although, both the arguments for and against affirmative action are 
missing the most fundamental problem. Whether upper castes have more rights than scheduled castes 
or vice versa, neither one of those scenarios are preventing discrimination as it is not providing an 
equal playing field for all parties involved. This is the issue that affirmative action cannot be used to 
resolve. In this case, the only logical way to develop an equal playing field is to eradicate the Hindu 
caste system all together, as it will always be a hierarchical system. 
 
Sharma argues that the quote above could be used as an admission of wrong doing on one hand and 
modification of behaviour on the other, which establishes a connection between the past, present and 
future. The quote does this in three separate partsŚ “The Lord is enshrined in the hearts of all. The lord 
is the supreme Reality,” could be explaining that whilst things constantly change and evolve, 
everything is a part of God and therefore is connected. “Rejoice in him through renunciation” could 
be discussing that you find peace and happiness when you admit your wrongdoings and renounce 
them, and “covet nothing” is speaking about sharing what exists, rather than labelling it as ‘yours’ and 
‘mine’. This argument also has flaws in itś It is no longer enough to apologise for the past and, 
unfortunately, the past can never be resolved. The sole focus of affirmative action should be finding a 
way to bridge the gap between treatments of the different castes in India.  
 
One of the issues with arguments for and against affirmative action is that, for the majority of cases, 
both parties are only seeing how the issue affects them. Dalits see affirmative action as a good thing, 
in the sense that it is allowing them opportunities they wouldn’t have previously had, but also 
acknowledge that it further isolates them as separate and ‘untouchable’, as can be seen in the various 
examples earlier in this chapter. Higher castes see affirmative action as a deprivation of job and 
education opportunities for them, in order to allow lower castes those opportunities. Indian religious 
teachings could be used to encourage people to take a step back and see things from a perspective 
other than their own. Radhakrishnan points out that a common Hindu view is to “sacrifice your 
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personal interests for the family, or the family for the community, of the community for the country of 
the country for the world,” (Radhakrishnan, 1927, p.90). Obviously, this is not always the case. 
Affirmative action is also opposed on the grounds that is ineffective and doesn’t deal with the root of 
the problem, as can be seen throughout this chapter. On the other hand, affirmative action has been 
supported by some high caste out of a sense of social justice, even though they will gain nothing from 
it.  
 
The argument of affirmative action and religion naturally brings forth the many disputes between 
Ambedkar and Gandhi, over whether Dalits will ever hold an equal place in Indian society. Ambedkar 
was a dalit political leader and very firmly believed that Hinduism would never allow Dalits to hold 
an equal place in society. For Ambedkar, all castes including ĝūdras were enemies to Dalits, because 
they were part of the caste system and practiced Brahmin ideology (Kumar, 2000, p. 3978). 
Ambedkar fought for the idea that in order to destroy the caste system and discrimination that comes 
with it, Dalits had to unite and oppose the varna system and all of the castes. Gandhi, however, held 
slightly different views. Whilst he also disagreed with the discrimination against ‘Harijans’ or Dalits, 
he believed that it could be reconciled whilst still maintaining traditional Hindu values in the caste 
system. He believed that the true prize would be given to Harijans if they persevered with Hinduism 
until untouchability is destroyedŚ “if untouchability is destroyed root and branch and Hinduism lives, 
the future historian will assign the place of honour to Harijans who will have stood by their faith in 
spite of heartless persecutions by their fellows,” (Gandhi, cited in Sharma, 2005, pp.79-80). Gandhi 
spoke about how, in the beginning, affirmative action was based around rights to enter and worship at 
temples. “Temple entry is the one spiritual act that would constitute the message of freedom to the 
untouchables and assure them that they are not outcasts before God. Hinduism has sinned in giving 
sanction to untouchability. It has degraded us and made us the pariahs of the empire,” (Gandhi, 1958, 
p.290). This shows that the initial goal of affirmative action, to bridge the gap in society between high 
castes and Dalits and to make society equal in all aspects, has been lost amongst arguments for quotas  
and education.  
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Although the issue of temple entry is still an important topic, A.A. does not solve this problem. It 
deals with Dalits having less chances in education and employment, but it does not attempt to fix the 
deep rooted societal inequalities. Whilst education and employment are important, one of the worst 
aspects of untouchability is the limitation it places upon a religious person’s rights to exercise their 
own religion. Gandhi is pointing out that untouchability has made fellow Hindus outcasts of their own 
faith, and that is something that needs to be addressed. Whilst not casting judgement on the strengths 
or weaknesses of affirmative action policies, he has admitted that something needs to be done to 
correct the unfairness of untouchability.  
 
Affirmative action in everyday life 
It is important to look at Indian communities and the practicality of A.A. in everyday life. Earlier in 
this chapter it was pointed out that one of the reasons affirmative action often fails is because Indian 
society is not united in wanting it to work. This is not only the case in India. In the U.S. there have 
been policies in place that enforce affirmative action and when people do not follow these, there can 
be legal consequences. Disalvo and Ceasar (2004) discussed how, in the U.S., businesses pretended to 
draw up charts and planning, in order to avoid legal action, not because they wanted to aid the fight 
for equality (Disalvo, 2004, p.80). If it is the case that people in the U.S. are only following 
affirmative action when threatened by legal action, then how can the Indian government expect people 
to follow A.A.? There are no policies for monitoring quotas and affirmative action, and there are no 
repercussions if these quotas are not met. This can be seen by the suggestions of The Hague institute 
for global justice. The institute believes that monitoring systems are needed to reassess affirmative 
action and to allow for adjusting policies to meet current needs. It is believed that evidence-based 
research is needed to regularly review the impact of caste-based development tools. This research 
could identify shortcomings and optimise affirmative action. On a larger scale, the institute for global 
justice also proposes an international platform to share-best practices across different countries, in 
order to learn from past experiences (Appiah, 2015).  
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However, looking at the current disputes and riots over quotas and reservations, it is unlikely that 
A.A. will ever be effective, even if the policies were monitored. If the law of untouchability is not 
enforced by local authorities, as can be seen in cases where police have discarded cases of Dalits 
being mistreated, then it is not likely that all local authorities and governments would effectively 
follow affirmative action monitoring schemes. It is difficult to see how affirmative action will ever be 
successful, when evidence suggests that many citizens do not want it to be successful, and need to be 
threatened in order for policies to be followed. What must be taken into account though, is that some 
Hindus view the caste hierarchy as a fundamental principle of Hinduism, and therefore, it is not a 
natural instinct for Indian society to accommodate both the equality that affirmative action is trying to 
create and the natural principles that their daily lives work towards. This is effectively asking them to 
constantly contradict their own beliefs, which is what makes the fight for affirmative action in India 
so difficult. 
 
It has been argued that the reason that A.A. is not strong enough to prevent discrimination against 
Dalits is because the government do not really wish for the discrimination to end. Many people 
believe that affirmative action is there to give the illusion that the Indian government are promoting 
equality when, in reality, they are content with the Hindu caste system as it already stands. There is 
evidence to support this notion. Galanter showed that budgets supposedly allocated to benefit the 
disadvantaged in education and employment remain unutilized (Galanter, 1984, p.96). Also, 
reservations were originally created to be in proportion to the minorities’ presence in the population. 
However, though the population of minority groups has naturally increased over time, the quotas have 
remained the same (Jayal, 2014, p.119). The fact that Dalits in rural areas are still vulnerable, despite 
untouchability being outlawed over fifty years ago, could be argued as an indication that the 
government is not overly interested in abolishing discrimination. Shah (2006) highlighted in a survey 
of 565 villages in eleven Indian states found untouchability is still practised in 80% of these villages. 
Research showed that Dalits were subjected to violence and exploitation, and were dominant among 
the manual labours that earnt the lowest wages. Dalits also had typically higher poverty levels than 
people belonging to upper castes (Shah, 2006, p. 64). It can be argued it is difficult for India to hold 
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one unanimous opinion to stop all discrimination, as many consider caste hierarchy to lie at the heart 
of Hinduism. So, it becomes increasingly difficult for the eradication of discrimination to ever be 
achievable, if different areas of society, such as the government and local level authorities, are not 
united in their viewpoints. There are many regional variations with the effectiveness of affirmative 
action policies. An example of this can be seen in Rajasthan, where the Grijesh Dinker (the state co-
ordinator of national dalit movement for justice) explained a situation that involved two 8-year-old 
dalit students drinking from a teacher’s water pot. Those students were caught, beaten and as 
punishment, they and eleven other dalit students were expelled. The act of expelling the other nine 
students not involved in the incident cannot be justified by any means, and was simply the product of 
dalit discrimination; the school expelled them because they had the power to do so. This case was 
taken to the national level by Dinker, but the police investigation was closed down. This is further 
evidence that there are many people within the government and in local authority that are not truly 
interested in making a change to these inequalities (Coudere, 2016). 
 
Affirmative Action and human rights 
Despite these issues, equality still needs to be given to Dalits. Regardless of government or religious 
beliefs, it is a key element of human rights. Although not legally binding, the human rights act is 
considered universal, and was created by the United Nations to protect a human being’s inherent 
rights. India is part of the U.N and therefore, human rights need to be considered. The first and 
arguably the most important section of the universal declaration of human rights reads as follows: 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” (United Nations, 1948) 
Whilst it can be argued that human rights are not universal because they are a western value being 
placed on an eastern culture, and traditional Brahmanical Hinduism does not believe that all humans 
are born equal, it should also be noted that India was one of the 48 countries that voted in favour of 
this declaration. It can be reasonably argued that untouchability in India is a violation of the universal 
declaration of human rights. 
 
35 
 
Although it is legally outlawed in India, untouchability discrimination still occurs on a daily basis, 
particularly in the rural areas. In most villages in Rajasthan, Dalits are forbidden to draw water from 
the public well, as they are seen to pollute it (Coudere, 2016). They are also segregated to one area of 
the village away from the rest of the community. The National crime records bureau [N.C.R.B.] 
announced that crimes against Dalits increased by 29% from 2012-2014. In 2014 alone, 47,064 crimes 
against Dalits were registered (Jain, 2015). That amounts to 128 cases each day. These statistics show 
that affirmative action and outlawing untouchability has not been enough to stop discrimination from 
occurring. This brings forth the question of what else is necessary to prevent discrimination in India? 
The aspects that are most needed are the ones that are currently absent in Hindu society: a united wish 
to end discrimination by the higher castes and society in general, and a stronger fight from the Dalits 
themselves to assert their equal rights. 
 
How can the issues be overcome? 
From the arguments made in this chapter, it is clear to see that A.A. is not enough on its own, due to 
the failure to implement it successfully and the response it has received from the rest of the Indian 
population. The case of discrimination still needs to addressed though, which leads to further 
exploration of what other ways Dalits can help themselves outside of government quotas. Whether or 
not the Indian government do or do not want to eliminate discrimination, if equality is something that 
the Dalits wish to have then, to a certain degree, it falls on their shoulders to obtain. It will never be an 
easy task; Dalits are often stuck in the vicious cycle of oppression. In this sense, the cycle consists of 
Dalits being constantly reminded that they are polluted and worthless by upper castes, to the point 
where Dalits start believing that this is true. Then, because they believe it to be true, the rest of Indian 
society can argue that there is no point in giving Dalits special privileges, as they themselves feel 
undeserving.  
 
Evidence of Dalits believing that they are polluted can be seen in a video documentary ‘India 
Untouched’. In this video, the dalit states that people cannot touch them “because they will get 
polluted. This is how the world is,” (Sagittarii, 2013). In order to break this cycle, Dalits need to find 
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and fight for their own self-worth, emphasising Ambedkar’s argument that Dalits should stand united 
and proud of their identity. This is particularly difficult for Dalits to accomplish though, when they 
often receive harsher punishments for standing up for their rights. When looking at the rise of crimes 
against Dalits earlier in this chapter, the article argued that the reason these crimes have increased is 
because Dalits are speaking out about these crimes (Courdere, 2016). This could be read as either the 
crimes have always been at such a high number, but many Dalits were too scared to come forward and 
record these crimes, or it could be suggesting that as Dalits are coming forward and recording these 
crimes they, and other Dalits, are being punished as a result.  
 
All of these points lead to the solution that, whilst dalit activism and affirmative action may not be 
enough on their own, they might be enough when working together. As the next chapter explores 
religious conversion as a means of dalit activism and the success and weaknesses that have occurred, 
it needs to be understood as one piece of a puzzle. When all of the pieces -- affirmative action, dalit 
activism, and the will of Hindu society -- are working harmoniously towards the common goal of 
eradicating untouchability completely, only then will India succeed in creating an equal society. A 
good analogy of this lies in the Bhagavad Gita, in chapter 3 verses 14-16, when discussing the 
dharmachakra:  
All living bodies subsist on food grains, which are produced from rains. Rains are produced 
by performance of yajña [sacrifice], and yajña is born of prescribed duties. Regulated 
activities are prescribed in the Vedas, and the Vedas are directly manifested from the 
Supreme Personality of Godhead. Consequently, the all-pervading Transcendence is eternally 
situated in acts of sacrifice. My dear Arjuna, one who does not follow in human life the cycle 
of sacrifice thus established by the Vedas certainly leads a life full of sin. Living only for the 
satisfaction of the senses, such a person lives in vain. (Prabhupāda,2016, pp.152-155) 
 
Whilst the wheel of dharma is focussed on a Hindu’s duty in life, the analogy of the wheel serves to 
show that it is only successful when all of the sections of the wheel and working together. If the reins 
were removed, for example, the wheel of dharma would no longer work. The same principle applies 
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to eliminating untouchability. In the past, this argument has often been used in support of the varna 
system, and how everyone needs to perform their prescribed duties to ensure communal harmony. 
Unfortunately, arguments in this chapter have shown that it is no longer realistic to believe the 
untouchability will ever be truly eradicated, so long as the varna and caste systems are still a part of 
Hindu society. To have true equality it must be accepted and understood that every person is equally 
important. India no longer needs to distinguish people by high caste and dalit, but instead by the 
strengths and skills that each individual possesses. Everyone should be treated with equal respect. The 
Vedic story of the sacrifice of the cosmic man have also been used to understand the caste system: 
“The Brahman was his mouth, of both his arms was the Rajanya made. His thighs became the 
Vaishya, from his feet the ĝūdra was produced” (Benares, 1892). This is also continuing the idea that 
high caste people belong above low caste people, and needs to be eradicated. Even if it is suggesting 
that the brahmins need the ‘feet’ (Dalits), it is equally stating that Dalits lives are severely restricted 
by the movements of the ‘other parts of the body’. For discrimination to truly be over, everyone needs 
to stand side by side, not on top of each other. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has established that affirmative action is one of several class-based policies designed to 
overcome discrimination. A.A. has a clear weakness in identifying who is/isn’t eligible for reservation 
quotas, as can be seen in both India and the U.S. This lack of definitive guidelines has caused 
communities to fight for a ‘minority’ status, in order to gain access to the reservations, and violence 
occurs when these labels are denied. At the same time, the label of ‘minority’ is causing further 
discrimination against Dalits and increasing caste divisions. Evidence of this was shown earlier in this 
chapter, where Dalits often hid their identity due to fear. Sociologist Sambriddhi Kharel explains that 
discriminatory attitudes have resulted in “even the politically conscious, militant Dalit activists 
walking around with two visiting cards, one with a Dalit surname and the other with a non-Dalit one,” 
(Pun,2014). The minority label has led Dalits to face accusations of being incompetent and unworthy 
of their places in higher education and higher paying jobs, with the insinuation that they would not be 
intelligent enough to gain access to these opportunities without the help of reservations. Suggestions 
38 
 
of ways to improve the implementation of government quotas have been made, such as employing 
monitoring systems and providing stricter guidelines for eligibility.  
 
However, this chapter has shown that affirmative action is not helping to prevent the true problem of 
discrimination. The weaknesses shown in both India and U.S. affirmative action policies serve to 
show that equality is not necessarily easier to obtain in western society than eastern society. The 
success of A.A. policies rely on a united desire to end discrimination, shown through the U.S. 
government applying monitoring policies to ensure the continuation of equal opportunities for all. 
Caste discrimination is continuing to exist in India due to the lack of equality in education and, most 
importantly, due to the entrenched societal views of hierarchy and impurity. By providing Dalits with 
access to government employment and higher education without dealing with the deep-rooted beliefs 
that Dalits are not worthy of anything, all A.A. serves to accomplish is a deeper divide between caste 
communities and an increase in discrimination against Dalits. Although A.A. has been shown to 
provide a platform and a voice for Dalits to fight for equality, this platform would not be needed if 
India fought the true issues that are continuing case discrimination. Much evidence in this chapter has 
suggested that a continuation of discrimination is what many Indian citizens want. Higher castes have 
tried to accuse A.A. policies of ‘reverse discrimination’, as a means to eradicate affirmative action 
and allow caste discrimination to continue. The government has also shown they are not overly 
concerned with the eradication of caste discrimination, due to their unutilized budgets for Dalits and 
the lack of implementation procedures. This shows that affirmative action is being used as a cloak, so 
the government can appear to be targeting the problems that Dalits face, but in reality, the government 
is not dealing with the deep-rooted societal inequalities brought upon by caste beliefs. All the points 
made in this chapter points to the fact that it would not matter if A.A. was perfectly implemented, if 
Indian society still considered Dalits to be polluted and beneath them. It is the caste system 
hierarchical beliefs that need to be changed or eradicated from Hindu society, and the implementation 
of a completely equal education system for all that taught the equality of every individual, that will 
end caste-based discrimination in India.  
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Chapter Two: 
Dalit conversion as a response to Caste-Based Social Injustice 
The previous chapter focussed on various ways in which the government is working towards social 
equality, and the issues and complexities that it entails. This chapter is concerned with how Dalits 
themselves are combatting caste-based discrimination, as all areas of Indian society need to be 
working towards a common goal of eradicating social inequality, in order for the situation to change 
for the better. Conversion in India is an extremely complex issue. Many Dalits are converting as a 
means of escaping the entrenched caste system in India, and this chapter will focus on the success (or 
failure) of these transitions, and how effective it is as a means of combatting dalit discrimination. 
Dalits have converted to many religions over the decades, such as Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, 
Jainism and Sikhism. This section will focus on the dalit conversions to both Buddhism and 
Christianity, and how they have been met with very different reactions within Hindu society. It will 
analyse the successfulness of conversion to each religion as a response to caste-based social injustice. 
This section will then conclude with a comparison of the strength of conversion against the strengths 
of affirmative action as a means of combatting dalit exploitation and discrimination.  
 
Buddhism 
This section will focus on the dalit conversions to Buddhism. It will explore the history of Dalits 
searching for an identity under Ambedkar’s leadership, and how Ambedkar’s interpretation of 
Buddhism has helped encourage the Dalits to fight caste discrimination. It will examine how 
conversion to Buddhism has been used as a political protest for many Dalits, and how variations of 
Buddhist worship can be seen throughout Neo-Buddhist communities. Ultimately, this section will 
analyse how successful Buddhist conversion has been in combatting caste-based discrimination for 
Dalits.  
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Buddhism as identity 
Dalits have been fighting for equal rights within Indian society for centuries, but the largest cases of 
dalit conversion occurred after the establishment of India’s independence. It was during these highly 
significant political times that Dalits laid claim to being a minority nation. In a scheduled caste 
political conference in Allahabad, December 1942, it was argued that “India was not a nation but a 
constellation of nations,” (Bandhopadhyay, 2000, p.903). Ambedkar was the front-man of the dalit 
debates, arguing that besides the Hindus and Muslims, the scheduled castes are a necessary third party 
in India. For Ambedkar, Dalits were “no part of the Hindu community but constituted a different 
nation,” (Bandhopadhyay, 2000, p.906). By using the term nation, Ambedkar was arguing that there 
are a large number of Dalits, that Hindus do not treat as a welcome part of their own community, and 
yet they will not allow Dalits to have their own community and separate rights. Ambedkar had always 
held the belief that all Dalits and other minorities should unite and fight against the discrimination and 
exploitation that they have always received (Bhartiya, 2008, p.49). 
 
The dalit population is spread out widely over the entirety of India, and although they share the land 
with higher castes, the entire country runs in a hierarchical manner. This shows that, although India 
established a formal democracy, a sense of colonialization still exists. This internal colonialism 
creates a problem for Dalits because there is no physical escape for them. It is ingrained in every 
aspect of their lives. They have no independent territory that they can retreat to and, unlike the British 
in India, they are unable to ‘send home’ their colonisers. However, it could be argued that it is 
difficult for Dalits to lay claim to an independent history and culture. The truth is they are Indian 
citizens, born into the Indian hierarchy. They have only gained their distinctiveness as untouchables 
from the discrimination they have faced at the hands of Hindu society. In a sense, Dalits are caught in 
the bind of being Hindus and non-Hindus at the same time (Pandey, 2006, p.1781). 
 
As they are unable to leave India or claim an independent history, Dalits use whatever means they can 
to gain equal rights alongside their colonisers. One of their methods of doing so is to convert to a 
religion outside of Hinduism. Buddhism is a popular choice because it is still considered to be an 
41 
 
“Indian” religion. Ambedkar, the forefather of this movement, believed that the “surest means of 
assuring progress and the greatest of the country, was to embrace the faith of the Buddha and its 
fundamental principles- liberty, equality and fraternity.” He wrote that “Indians today are governed by 
two different ideologies. Their political ideal set out in the preamble to the constitution affirms a life 
of liberty, equality and fraternity. Their social ideal in their religion denies them. I have to do the 
work of conversion,” (Ambedkar, 2003, p. 503). For Ambedkar and other dalit leaders this wasn’t just 
a conversion to Buddhism; this was a conversion for the future, which would contribute to the social, 
political and economic uplift of the Dalits. They were looking for a religion of equality, with 
compassion and understanding. Ambedkar found this in Buddhism. 
 
Ambedkar’s Buddhism 
The majority of dalit conversions to Buddhism have occurred since Ambedkar’s conversion in 1956, 
which suggests Ambedkar was the driving force or influence over the Dalits. He publicly converted to 
Buddhism on the 14th October, 1956, at Deekshabhoomi in Nagpur. His conversion was unique in the 
sense that, after he took the traditional three refuges and five precepts from a Buddhist monk, more 
than 500,000 of his followers converted with him (Bardia, 2009, p.737). 
 
Interestingly, Ambedkar interpreted Buddhism slightly differently from traditional Buddhism in a 
number of ways. As Dalits converted to Buddhism following Ambedkar’s lead, it is likely that the 
majority of converts follow Ambedkar’s interpretation. This is why dalit converts are referred to as 
Neo-Buddhists or Navayanan Buddhists. Navayana translates as ‘new vehicle’, which is a comparison 
of Mahayana, ‘great vehicle’. Therefore, Navayanan Buddhism is the new vehicle of Buddhism. 
Dr. Ambedkar emphasised the rationality of BuddhismŚ “Buddhism is nothing if not rationalism, and 
Buddhism is the method of rational investigation embodied,” (Ambedkar, 1957, p.175). When he 
converted, he rationalised Buddhism and illustrated it in such a way as to show there is a religion that 
celebrates equality and does not rely on a supernatural being in order to find peace. In this way, 
Ambedkar is a primary example of a ‘Buddhist Modernist’, as described by Macmahan (Macmahan, 
2008). 
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Ambedkar argues that the Buddha rejected four vital theses of Hindu Brahmanic philosophy: 1) 
Sanctity and infallibility of the Vedas, 2) Salvation of the soul or escape from transmigration by 
performing Vedic sacrifices, 3) fourfold division of castes by birth and occupation as blueprint for 
ideal society, 4) Karma in previous lives to account for one’s present state. Ambedkar read these 
rejections as the Buddha’s desire to base his teachings in the domain of Earth and humans (Ganguly, 
2004, p.56). This is a rather contentious interpretation of Buddhist teachings. For example, Buddhist 
teachings do not reject karma and rebirth, as point four suggests, but explicitly accept both of these 
ideas. Whilst the Buddha taught, in the Pali Canon, that not everything in life is the result of good and 
bad actions, as natural events have an effect too, Buddhists do believe that their good or bad actions 
and intentions have an impact on their current and future lives.Ś “I am the owner of my karma. I 
inherit my karma. I am born of my karma. I am related to my karma. I live supported by my karma. 
Whatever karma I create, whether good or evil, that I shall inherit,” (Anguttara Nikaya, V.57). Good 
karma can lead to rebirth in a heavenly realm, for example. Karma is part of the cycle that Buddhists 
believe to be stuck in until detachment has been learned; only then can Buddhists escape the cycle of 
rebirth. This idea is explained in the four noble truthsŚ “To give oneself up to indulgence is sensual 
pleasure, give oneself up to Self-mortification, the painful, unholy, unprofitable; both these two 
extremes the Perfect One has avoided and found out the Middle path which makes one both to see and 
to know, which leads to peace, to discernment, to enlightenment, to Nibbana,” (Baruah, 2000, p.121). 
An example of Buddhists believing in karma can be seen in Tibetan prayer wheels. As these wheels 
are turned, the prayers are sent out into the universe, spreading good karma.  
 
Ambedkar formed his own interpretations from Buddhist ideas. He reinterpreted Dukkha, the central 
Buddhist notion of suffering and sorrow. In traditional Buddhism, the root cause of suffering is 
attachment that results from desires. Tanha, a type of desire that is often translated as craving, is 
thought to result in attachment. This is the second of the four noble truths. When a Buddhist detaches 
themselves from desire and therefore suffering, then they can find nirvana. Ambedkar believed that 
the recognition of suffering is the real basis of religion (Karunyakara, 2002, p.68). This suffering in 
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life is brought on by social and economic injusticeś misery is the result of man’s inequality to man. 
The only way to end that suffering is to take away the inequality which, in Ambedkar’s mind, was 
purely caused by the Hindu caste system. Ambedkar also formulated his sense of Dhamma, which is 
the guiding principle of social conscience. He believed that to maintain purity of life and reach 
perfection in life, one must give up craving and the belief of karma as rebirth, and believe that karma 
is the instrument of moral order, as one’s actions in this life have consequences in this life for oneself 
and others (Karunyakara, 2002, p.97). For Ambedkar, belief in God and the soul is against dhamma. 
Omvedt explained Ambedkar’s view as an extremely social interpretation, identifying it with social-
economic exploitation. She explains that “with this, the goal of action becomes not only the liberation 
of the individual seeker, but the transformation of the world,” (Omvedt, 2003, p.277). This shows 
Ambedkar’s Buddhism to be an example of socially engaged Buddhism. Macmahan describes social 
engagement as a common characteristic among Buddhist modernists (Macmahan, 2008, p.253).  
 
Ambedkar realised that religion works as both a social and motivational force. Buddhism is a 
motivational force as it inspires individuals to act upon an event, withstand difficulties and accept 
failures with a sense of detachment. It is a social force as it gives the dalit community an identity that 
isn’t focussed on discrimination. Ambedkar’s Buddhism has given the Dalits a sense of social 
security.  
 
Ambedkar was very keen to dismiss the idea of God and the soul. Valerian Rodrigues and Gauri 
Vishwanathan point out that Ambedkar’s foregrounding of Buddha’s atheism has been seen as 
evidence of Ambedkar’s desire to transcend religiosity and seek recourse in modern institutions and 
practices of democracy and governance (Rodrigues, 1993, p.315). This is partly true; Ambedkar used 
Buddhism to show Dalits a modern and rational way of thinking that was separate from the Hindu 
notions of caste and hierarchy. However, it’s not entirely true that Ambedkar desired to transcend 
religiosity. Whilst he was avoiding the supernatural elements of Hinduism, which explains his 
rejection of God, he was very much focussed on finding a religion and a faith that he could believe in. 
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He found that in Buddhism. It accepted everyone as equal and Ambedkar felt that Buddhism 
eliminated the problems he could see within India society. 
 
 Ambedkar’s interpretation of Buddhism was unveiled by the publication of Ambedkar’s rewriting of 
the life of the Buddha and his principle beliefs in The Buddha and his Dharma in 1957. This work has 
served as the foundational religious text for dalit Buddhists (Ganguly, 2004, p.50). Within this work it 
could be clearly seen that Ambedkar was interpreting Buddhism as an ideology that responded best to 
the need of modern India. Jayashree Gokhale- Turner read Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism in 
terms of ‘liberation theology’Ś “seen as an inalienable aspect of the experience of coming into 
modernity among the oppressed around the world,” (Turner, 1981, p.37). Dalit writers, who wish to 
sever connections with Indian traditions, have interpreted Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism as 
symbolising a total break from non-modern ways of engaging with the world (Ganguly, 2004, p.53). 
This is referring to Ambedkar’s interpretation of Buddhism as a tool for equality and separation for 
Dalits.  
 
Ambedkar’s insistence on Dalits converting to Buddhism came as a last resort, as he initially sought 
to reform Hinduism in such a way that Dalits could be free from discrimination without converting. In 
section 24 of his speech ‘Annihilation of Caste’, he explained a possible reformation that centred 
around the changes to Brahmins. He argued for a singular, standard Hindu holy book, that was 
available and recognised by all Hindus. He believed that all other Hindu holy books should be 
discarded by law. In an ideal world for Ambedkar, he believed in the abolition of all priests. However, 
he relented that priesthood could remain if it was no longer hereditary, and anybody could be eligible 
to become a priest, providing they could pass an exam. He finally suggested that the number of priests 
in India should be limited, and insisted that all priests should be viewed as servants of the state and 
subject to disciplinary action (Ambedkar, 2016, p.308). It is clear from these reformation suggestions 
that Ambedkar viewed Hindu priests to be main cause of caste discrimination in India:  
The whole thing is abominable, and is due to the fact that the priestly class among Hindus is 
subject neither to law nor to morality. It recognises no duties. It knows only of rights and 
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privileges. It is a pest which divinity seems to have let loose on the masses for their mental 
and moral degradation… It will certainly help to kill Brahminism and will also help to kill 
caste, which is nothing but Brahminism incarnate. Brahminism is the poison which has 
spoiled Hinduism (Ambedkar, 2016, p.310). 
 
The reform of the Hindu caste system never came to fruition, which is why Ambedkar felt that Dalits 
would never be free from oppressionŚ “unlike a drop of water which loses its identity when it joins the 
ocean, man does not lose his being in the society in which he lives. Man’s life is independent. He is 
born not for the development of the society alone, but for the development of his self too,” 
(Ambedkar, quoted in David, 2013, p.57).  
 
Whilst Ambedkar interpreted Buddhism in a rather rationalist, modernist way that supports his social 
and political activism, that does not mean that he wasn’t fully committed to Buddhism and to the 
conversion of Dalits. Religion is always subject to interpretation and evolution, and Neo-Buddhists 
have developed their own version of Buddhism that allows them freedom from caste discrimination 
whilst encompassing methods of devotion that they are used to.  
 
Vidhu Verma argued that Ambedkar weakened Buddhism by interpreting it in his own wayŚ “by 
spending considerable energy exploring key conceptions in Buddhism, Ambedkar leaves us 
wondering how helpful Buddhism is if the terminology is so open to interpretation.” (Verma, 1999, 
p.2809). However, this is not a strong argument as religions continuously evolve and are interpreted 
by followers in different ways. Buddhism is an extremely diverse religion, with many schools and 
traditions that continue to evolve.  
 
Neo-Buddhist worship 
In this previous section, Ambedkar’s rejection of God and worshipping God-heads could be clearly 
seen. After his conversion, he performed the dhamma diksha ceremony to the new converts, which 
included twenty-two vows that he made to his followers. One of these vows stated “I shall not 
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perform Shraddha nor shall I give pind,” (Omvedt, 2003, p.261). These are both ceremonies in which 
Hindu worshippers traditionally pay homage to their ancestors. Ambedkar was also against the 
worshipping of idolsŚ “I am no worshipper of idols, I believe in breaking them,” (Ambedkar, 1943). 
Ambedkar was against the worshipping of idols and God as he believed in the rationality of religion, 
and the rights of Dalits to be able to live without fear of deities and hierarchy, albeit hierarchy 
between caste or the hierarchy of humans and god-figures.  
 
Omvedt argued that Ambedkar’s rejection of Hindu modes of worship has had a reverse effect, in the 
sense that it has given Dalits a reason to view Ambedkar as the replacement object of worshipŚ “Dalits 
embracing Buddhism could get very caught up in other forms of superstitionś very often Ambedkar’s 
very rationalism seems simply to have left ground for re-entry of superstition centred around 
Ambedkar himself, the king (God) of Dalits,” (Omvedt, 1994, p.249). Whilst it is true that there are 
idols and statues of Ambedkar in India, which will be discussed below, it may not necessarily be true 
that dalit converts are viewing him as a ‘God’. The reason for these statues could instead be viewed as 
a commemoration to the work Ambedkar did in support of the dalit movement, and as a reminder that 
they deserve to be treated with as many rights as those that belong to higher castes. In these instances, 
Ambedkar is looked up to as a teacher and their social leader, rather than their ‘God’.  
 
These statues, that pay homage to Ambedkar and the work he performed, can be seen throughout 
India, in towns, cities, villages, at crossroads, railway stations and in parks. The first statue was 
created in 1962, and placed at the institute of science crossing in Mumbai (Tartakov, 2000, p.106). 
Another famous Ambedkar statue was created in 1984, placed by Kanshi Ram, the founder of the 
B.S.P. (Bahujan Samaj) political party (Pai, 2002, p.93). The B.S.P., as mentioned in other sections 
throughout this thesis, is the third largest national political party in India, which was formed mainly to 
represent scheduled tribes and caste. One of the largest statues is situated in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, 
in the Ambedkar memorial park (Sinhal, 2015).  
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These statues are important to Dalits as they represent the struggles that Dalits faced, and are another 
example of self-assertion of dalit rights. They do not only represent the gratitude that Dalits have 
towards Ambedkar and his mission for dalit equality, but it is also a reminder of how far they have 
come in terms of escaping caste discrimination and still how far they have to go in their mission for 
complete liberation. French Anthropologist Nicolas Jaoul wrote that, “In the context of poverty and 
illiteracy where they operate, such symbolic means have profound political implications, promoting 
ideals of citizenship and nationhood among the politically destitute where the state has partially 
failed,” (Jaoul, 2006, p.176). 
 
Unfortunately, these statues have become the centre of controversies, particularly in the past few 
years. The statue of Ambedkar situated in the memorial park in Lucknow is G.O.I.ng to be joined with 
statues of other leaders, including those from upper castes. The states cabinet minister for backward 
classes welfare stated thatŚ “we will install statues of all the great personalities who deserve honour, 
irrespective of their caste,” (Masoodi, 2017). Vivek Kumar, a professor at Jiwaharlal Nehru 
University in Delhi, has disagreed with this statement and believes that if the idea really is to create an 
egalitarian society, the approach of the government should be differentŚ “Let every park and memorial 
of upper caste leaders all house a Dalit and O.B.C. icon. This is fascism to the hilt to dismantle the 
spaces of the subaltern classes… who have never had independent spaces of their own,” (Masoodi, 
2017). Other examples of upper castes being unhappy about the statues can be seen all across India. In 
Tamil Nadu, the statues of Ambedkar have had to be placed in cages, as dominant castes have been 
desecrating them by garlanding them with slippers and cutting off their heads (Biswas, 2015).  
 
Statues are not the only form of commemoration used by Neo-Buddhists. Important dates for Neo-
Buddhists, such as Ambedkar’s birthday (April 14th), the Buddha’s birthday at the end of April, 
Ambedkars conversion day (October 14th) and the anniversary of Ambedkar’s death (December 6th) 
are all commemorated with Buddhist rituals. The celebration of Ambedkar’s birthday in Nana Rao 
Park is the most important public arena activity of each year, with a procession that travels through 
the whole of Kanpur (Jaoul, 2006, p.182). This suggests that many Neo-Buddhists view Ambedkar 
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with greater reverence than Buddha. This is likely due to the social message that Ambedkar spread 
and his importance in recent dalit history. In 2000, the Ravidas Julus procession floats showed 
atrocities inflicted on Dalits e.g. rape and murder. They also hung a banner showing guru Nanak, 
Ravidas, Ambedkar and Buddha side by side in a unified rejection of the caste system (Bellwinkel-
Schempp, 2007, p. 2182).  
 
Although Ambedkar rejected worship of Hindu deities, some Neo-Buddhists still continue to 
participate in Hindu religion activities. An example of this was given by Ganguly, who spoke about 
his family’s maid who was a dalit Buddhist. Whilst Sushila (the maid) wished for typical Buddhist 
treatment in the form of a day’s absence from work on the Birthday of the Buddha and Ambedkar, she 
also demanded special treatment and gifts during Hindu festivals as well. She partook in Hindu 
festivals and placed a Buddha statue in the family’s prayer room, alongside the family’s Hindu deities 
(Ganguly, 2004, p. 50). Sushila is a typical example of many dalit Buddhists in India, who signal the 
failure of the Ambedkarite conversion to a certain extent. Ambedkar’s wish for Dalits to sever all ties 
with their Hindu past will be a very difficult thing to accomplish, particularly when Neo-Buddhists 
and Hindus live in the same villages etc as each other. Also, for many Buddhist converts, the 
importance of their conversion lays with their need to feel detachment from the exploitation suffered 
at the hands of the Hindu caste system. As Ambedkar’s greatest desire was to free Dalits from 
discrimination, it cannot necessarily be argued that he has failed entirely. Dalit writer Shankarrao 
Khara expresses his feelings on what it means to convertŚ “I have accepted the Buddhist Dhamma. I 
am Buddhist now. I am not a Magar, nor an untouchable, nor even a Hindu… I have become 
independent. I am now free. I have now become a free citizen in independent India.” (Zelliot, 1992, 
p.238) If Neo-Buddhists feel free from discrimination and happy to continue integrating and 
celebrating Hindu festivals as well as Buddhist celebrations, then they are forming their own 
interpretation of Ambedkar’s Buddhist teachings and Ambedkar has, to a certain extent, achieved the 
dalit freedom that he was striving for.  
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Another example of the integration of Buddhism and Hindu modes of worship to the Neo-Buddhist 
life of dalit converts can be seen in Maharashtra, where the converts take part in Bhakti worship. Neo-
Buddhists express their devotion to Ambedkar in the same manner as the Bhakti saint poets of 
medieval India expressed devotions to Hindu Gods. Ambedkar criticised Mahars’ attempts of deriving 
inspiration from Chokhamela, the 14th century Bhakti poet. Twenty years before the community 
converted to Buddhism, Ambedkar also appealed to the Mahars to cast off labels that would remind 
them of patronage to the upper caste Hindus. (Ambedkar, 1930, P.103). It is interesting that 
Ambedkar did not approve of the Mahar’s association with bhakti, particularly as the medieval bhakti 
poets were often very critical of caste. (Ganguly, 2004, p.58) This is likely to be one of the reasons 
why Mahar leaders took inspiration from the bhakti tradition. In the same way that Ambedkar fought 
for the freedom of Dalits, it is probable that some Mahar Dalits see bhakti as a resource for their fight 
for social justice. Despite these facts, the literary movement that emerged in Maharashtra following 
the conversion of the Mahar community in the late 1960s refused to trace its antecedents to the 
writings of Chokhamela (Ganguly, 2004, p.59).  
 
However, the worship of Ambedkar and the Buddha in the bhakti mode is a common phenomenon, 
especially in rural Maharashtra. Whilst Ambedkar has given Dalits a sense of self-dignity and a self-
reliant rejection of caste and inequality, this has not stopped them from participating in festivals and 
rituals. Temples have been built with images and idols of the Buddha and Ambedkar. Their birthdays 
are both treated as sacred days, and many devotional folk songs have been dedicated to Ambedkar and 
the Buddha. Indira Jhungare has collect many mahar folk songs that treat Ambedkar both as a 
personalised God and the supreme deity, omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent. (Jhungare, 1988, 
p.101) Most modes of worship are akin to those of bhakti and hence they do not signal a disinjunction 
with the past as Ambedkar had hoped his Buddhism would do. However, like the statues of Ambedkar 
in India, these dalit modes of worship symbolise their struggle against discrimination, which Dalits 
continue to use as motivation for their fight for social injustice.  
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Conversion as a political protest 
C. Lakshmanan, an associate professor at the Madras Institute of Development Studies in Chennai 
wrote that “In India, conversion is a mode of protest and expressing dissatisfaction. It is both political 
and religious,” (Dore, 2016). Just as Indian politics are central to dalit rights in the form of 
reservations, they play an equally important role in a dalit’s choice to convert. This is particularly true 
of dalit conversions to Buddhism. It has been argued that Dalits use initiation into Buddhism as a 
gesture of protest. This can be seen in past instances in history, where each time the Dalit movement 
peaked, the number of conversions to Buddhism rose. Two examples of this are in 1956, after BR. 
Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism, and in the 1980s, when the B.S.P. rose to prominence 
 (Moudgil, 2017). Currently, 87% of the Buddhists population in India are neo- converts. 
 
A very recent example of Dalits converting to Buddhism as a form of protest can be seen in May 
2017, when 180 dalit families converted to Buddhism in the Saharanpur district, after Thakurs torched 
dalit houses and desecrated a Sant Ravidas temple. Thakurs are high-caste people, originally 
stemming from the Kṣatriyas (warrior) class in the varna system. The Dalits converts claimed to be 
protesting against the “unfair targeting of the community and Bhim army,” (Agarwali, 2017). These 
conversions occurred after several confrontations between Dalits, the Bhim army and Thakurs, which 
resulted in injuries on both sides. The Dalits believe that these were pre-planned attacks by the 
Thakurs against Dalits, as they happened when the men were out in the fields. This meant that it was 
the dalit women who were beaten. The Saharanpur Dalits have also claimed that they were prevented 
from installing an Ambedkar statue in their half of the village. Whilst these attacks were taking place, 
the local police failed to intervene, as they were targeting the Bhim army who they believed were 
triggering all of these violent protests. The Bhim army is a pro-dalit group that is working for dalit 
emancipation through education (Tiwari, 2017). It currently runs 350 free schools for Dalits in 
western Uttar Pradesh, and they are trying to register a ‘pan-India presence’ (Tiwari, 2017). They are 
a perfect example of dalit activism as a means of overcoming discrimination, and an organisation that 
works in harmony with all Dalits, converts or Hindu.  
 
51 
 
Although no repercussions were dealt to the Thakurs for burning the dalit houses, the Uttar Pradesh 
police announced a bounty of Rs 12,000 on Chandrashekhar, one of the Bhim army founders, for 
setting vehicles on fire after the incident took place (HindustanTimes, 2017). Chandrashekhar was 
also accused on “spreading hatred among people by misusing social media,” (HindustanTimes, 2017). 
This occurred after the government (B.J.P.) suspended all internet services in Saharanpur to prevent 
protest organising from spreading on social media. This simmering conflict between Thakur and dalit 
is just one example of how “many Dalits convert out of Hinduism because of the entrenched caste 
system that gives little space for their upward mobility,” (Aljazeera, 2017). Jinesh Mevani, a Gujarat 
lawyer who campaigns for dalit rights, has shown support for the Bhim army, stating that the situation 
of the dalit conversions are “not merely an expression of Dalits defending themselves against upper 
castes, but an assertion of and by Dalits against the relentless oppression they continually face,” 
(Aljazeera, 2017).  
 
One of the most upsetting things for the dalit converts is that, whilst they felt they were not taken 
seriously by the police during the violence, they are still not taken seriously in regards to their 
conversion. One police officer stated that “Buddhism is only a branch of Hinduism. Like some people 
go to Arya Samaj temple, some people will go to Buddhist temples. Everybody at the end of the day is 
Hindu,” (Agarwali, 2017). This is a perfect example of the entrenched caste system within Indian 
society. For this Hindu, and many other Hindus in India, there is no escape from the caste system. To 
them, converting to Buddhism does not change anything. Unfortunately, this shows a weakness within 
conversion as a means of escaping discrimination. If Dalits are still seen as Dalits, whether they are 
Hindu or convert to Buddhism, they will always be treated with the same discrimination by Hindus 
that they felt before their conversion. However, their new identity can give them access to a sense of 
community, which has helped some groups to achieve social and economic mobility. This will be 
explored fully later in this chapter.  
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Neo-Buddhists and location in India  
Just as location of Buddhist followers around the world affects their Buddhist beliefs, location within 
India is also equally influential over Buddhism and conversion. The latest census showed that while 
the population of Buddhists in India grew by 6.13% from 2001-2011, the population of Hindus grew 
by 16.76%. At first glance, this could suggest that conversion to Buddhism has not been entirely 
successful with the dalit population. However, previous indications that conversion is used primarily 
as a political tool for Dalits suggests that these statistics are not an adequate representation of the 
successfulness of dalit conversion. This fluctuation in numbers can be attributed to a variety of factors 
that affect the community, such as politics, location and social interactions.  
 
As India is such a large country with a huge population, one of the factors that affects Buddhist 
conversion is location within India. Most Buddhists reside in the North/ North East states of India. 
Maharashtra has the largest concentration in India, with a 58.3% of the state’s population declaring 
themselves as Buddhist (CensusIndia, 2001). Maharashtra holds 90% of India’s Buddhist population, 
which grew by 11.85% from 2001-2011, where the population of Buddhists residing in Maharashtra 
now standing at 6.5 million (Moudgil, 2017). Sandeep Upre, the president of Satyashodhak O.B.C. 
Parishad, an organisation that conducts initiation rites programmes in Maharashtra, believes there is a 
reason that the Buddhist population is so high: “Constant influence of social reformers, including 
Jyotiba Phule and BR Ambedkar, has ensured that people here are more aware and secure enough to 
leave their Hindu identity,” (Moudgil, 2017). Uttar Pradesh is another Northern state with a large 
concentration of Buddhist residents. A possible reason for this could be that Uttar Pradesh has 
important Buddhist pilgrimage spots, such as Sarnath and Kushinagar. It is also known for its 
considerable support for the B.S.P., a political party known for its support of dalit rights (Moudgil, 
2017).  
 
Looking at a southern state in India, Karnataka has seen a decline in Buddhist population by 75% 
between 2001-2011. This is particularly interesting as this follows an upsurge of 439% from 1991-
2001. This is likely to have been in response of the B.S.P. winning their first assembly seat in South 
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India. As the sway of the B.S.P. has declined over recent years, this explains the lower percentage of 
Buddhists in Karnataka. Another political reason that has attributed to this is that caste certification 
was denied by state government in Karnataka. This resulted in the exclusion of neo-Buddhists from 
reservations in education and employment. Although the government of India changed their policies 
in 1936, labelling neo-Buddhists as scheduled castes, Karnataka never publicly acknowledged this 
change. Therefore, it is possible that some dalit Buddhist converts still retain their Hindu caste 
certificate and declare themselves Hindu in government surveys, as a way of maintaining their 
reservation advantage (Moudgil, 2017).  
 
How has conversion to Buddhism helped Dalits within the community and with their fight for 
social justice? 
Conversion to Buddhism has helped the dalit communities in a variety of different ways. In terms of 
identity and community, an increase in spiritual strength can be seen among the Neo-Buddhists, who 
feel they have been given a voice and a platform to air their grievances over caste discrimination. 
They also feel a sense of community among other Buddhists and loyalty towards their religion, which 
perhaps they were not so passionate about previously, as they felt consistently humiliated and 
exploited. An example of this change could be seen in Gaya, in May 2015. During the Buddha Jayanti 
celebrations, to commemorate the birth, enlightenment and death of the Buddha inside the Bodh 
Gaya, B.J.P. protestors marched upon the celebration waving black flags. They were led by former 
minister Prem Kumar. The Neo Buddhists responded to the protest by waving slogans demanding 
total Buddhist control over the Bodh Gaya, as it is recognised as the seat of enlightenment. The shrine 
is currently under joint management by both the Hindus and the Buddhists. Despite the protest, the 
current minister Nitish Kumar participated in the celebrations, which included mantras dedicated to 
world peace. The Buddhist management team of the Bodh Gaya also presented a cheque of Rs 21 
Lakh for relief to the survivors of the Nepal earthquake tragedy (TimesofIndia, 2015b). This situation 
shows that, by converting to Buddhism, Dalits have found their ‘voice’ and are choosing to fight for 
their rights, which they may have felt they were unable to do before. Also, the joining in of minister 
Nitish Kumar indicates that there are some instances of acceptance between Hindus and Neo-
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Buddhists which were previously Dalits. Although there is more understanding of Dalits converting to 
Buddhism as Hindus see it as a branch of Hinduism, it is still encouraging to see that there are some 
people in the India government that do not continue to discriminate using caste once a person has 
converted to Buddhism.  
 
An example of other Buddhists reaching out to help Dalits in India can be seen through the work of 
Trailokya Bauddha Mahasangha Sahayaka Gana (TBMSG). This is the Indian wing of the Triratna 
Buddhist Community, an international Buddhist movement with over sixty centres on five continents. 
After Ambedkar’s death, the TBMSG worked to develop a new Indian Buddhism, by fusing dharma 
practice and social action (Clear view project, no date given). Together with two of their related 
organisations, Bahujan Hitay and the Jambudvipa trust, they created the Manuski project. The 
mission of this project is to: 
1) Transcend caste barriers through social development programs. 
2) Fight social discrimination through legal and constitutional ways. 
3) Develop dalit women leadership. 
4) Create sustainability of the social projects and build solidarity amongst the individuals and 
organisations (Manuski Project Summary, 2008).  
So far, this project and the TBMSG has built a network of over 150 organisations working for the 
marginalised communities in India (TBMSG.org, no date given).  
 
According to the 2001 census, the Buddhist population is just shy of 8 million people in India 
(CensusIndia, 2001). This shows that conversion to Buddhism is popular, and evidence suggests that 
it has helped Dalits psychologically to overcome interiorised attitudes of inferiority. This can be seen 
in the numerous rallies and protests where Dalits have praised Buddhism for treating all human beings 
equally and slated upper castes for discriminating. In 2001, Navayana Buddhist leader Udit Ray 
organised a large mass conversion. The Dalits that attended this ceremony carried flags and anti- 
upper caste banners. One of the Dalits that attended stated his reasons for wanting to convert:  
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I want to leave casteism and Hinduism. We are disgraced every day, at every place. We have 
to bear the stigma of casteism. Joining Buddhism is the only way to escape the chains of 
slavery. Buddhism respects and treats all human beings equally. It is the best religion (Singh, 
2001). 
Situations like this show the positive psychological impact that conversion can have on Dalits, and 
equally the fear of traditional caste believers who do not want Indian society to change. The police 
attempted to prevent this ceremony and mass conversion from taking place by placing ‘fraudulent’ 
banners outside stating that it had been cancelled. Dalit leaders took great offence to this interference, 
with leader Net Raj arguing that: 
Is it done anywhere in the world to put barricades for the citizens of the country to stop them 
from performing a peaceful religious ceremony, the right which the constitution of the 
government guarantees? It’s the upper-class Hindus who are doing it as they are angry that we 
are walking away from their slavery and they are losing control (Raj, quoted in Singh, 2001). 
 
Conversion to Buddhism has also helped Dalits by increasing literacy rates, allowing them greater 
work participation compared to scheduled caste Hindus. The current Buddhist literacy rate is 81.29%, 
compared to scheduled caste rate of 66%. Satpal Tanwar, a leader of the Bhim army, stated that “most 
Dalits are senior levels of administration are Buddhists,” (IANS, 2017). Maharashtra holds the second 
highest number of literate Buddhists, at 83.17%, after the rate in Chhattisgarh is as high as 87.34%. It 
is possible that Dalits have converted after education, which they receive to an extent via government 
reservations, as they become more aware of their rights in society. By using this knowledge as 
strength to challenge the caste system by converting to Buddhism, dalit converts now enjoy a higher 
work ratio as well. It’s been noted that 43.15% of all Neo-Buddhists are in paid employment, 
compared to 40.87% of scheduled castes (IANS, 2017).  
 
Evidence looked at in previous sections has shown Buddhist conversion to be a successful 
psychological tool in the sense that it gives Dalits a feeling of self-worth and self-dignity. 
Unfortunately, it has not been a complete success in terms of a political protests, as many Hindus still 
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view it as a branch of Hinduism and therefore, still view them as untouchable. But, although it has not 
been a perfect transition, overall conversion to Buddhism can be thought of as a relative success. It 
may not have completely eradicates social injustice against Dalits but it has empowered them, giving 
them an identity, a real sense of community and has inspired them to continue fighting the struggles 
they face. Rather than giving in and accepting discrimination as ‘the inevitable’ in India, they have 
used Ambedkar’s interpretation of Buddhism and statues of him as strength and motivation in their 
continuous fight for a caste-free society.  
 
Christianity 
This section will explore dalit conversions to Christianity as a means of combatting social injustice. 
The history of Christianity and Christian missionaries in India will be examined, and how this had an 
effect over the dalit communities. It will then illustrate the ways in which Christianity has helped and, 
in many cases, failed the dalit converts in their struggle for inequality. The differences between caste 
denominations and their treatment of Dalits shall be explored, with particular emphasis on the 
presence of caste discrimination that exists among dalit Catholic communities. This section will then 
examine the government reactions to Christian conversion, the political struggles that Christian Dalits 
face in India and the backlash of violence that has been caused. It will conclude with analysing 
whether or not Christian conversions have been successful in helping Dalits tackle the problem of 
caste-based social injustice.  
 
Although considered a minority, Christianity is the third-largest religion in India, according to the 
2011 Census. Its origins in India date back to the visit of Thomas the Apostle, in 52 AD (Jones, 2012, 
p. 93), but the most dramatic increase of Christians occurred between 1890-1930; this has been named 
the ‘mass movement’. Censuses have shown that the Christian population grew from 1,246,288 in 
1872 to 6,020,887 in 1932 (Webster, 1992, p56). These mass conversions happened nearly twenty 
years before Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism, during the British Raj, which suggests the 
missionaries that came over at that time had an influence over these conversions. It has been noted 
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that Christian missionaries impacted Indian society both religiously and spiritually in a significant and 
consequential manner (Palsetia, 2006, p.616).  
 
 
 
Why are Dalits choosing Christianity? 
Dalits have seen conversion to Christianity as another way to escape the discrimination of the Hindu 
caste system, though in a slightly different way to Buddhism. Webster has argued that “the underlying 
motivation was the search for improved social status, for a greater sense of personal dignity and self-
respect, and for freedom from bondage to oppressive land owners,” (Webster, 1994, p.54). To some 
degree, Christianity has been able to help Dalits achieve this goal, as Christianity in India has 
promoted health, education and economic dependence for Dalits. However, in some Christian 
communities, caste is still an active feature, preventing Dalits from escaping the discrimination and 
exploitation of the system.  
 
In the late 1920s, the National Christian Council of India commissioned a study on the Christian 
movements. The findings of this study were published in a book by J. W. Pickett, who showed how 
“the movements helped to liberate oppressed Dalits and tribals from the ago-old bondage of Hindu 
caste system,” (Pachuau, 2014, p.158). This has also been observed by Sathianathan Clarke, who gave 
the following statement of dalit mass conversion movements: 
Religious conversions are a conscious mobilization of disadvantaged communities. Religious 
conversion to Christianity was a community effort by the Dalits to denounce the symbolic 
worldview of conventional religion within which the legitimization of the all-encompassing 
caste-based social order works (Clarke, 2003, p.338). 
 
Dalit Christian converts began during the British raj. As the Anglican church was the established 
church of England, it “had an impact on India with the arrival of the British,” (Dalal, 2014, p.177). 
The growth of the British Army led to the arrival of many Anglican Chaplains in India (Tovey, 2017, 
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p.197). Although the missionaries initially targeted the upper- caste, as they “hoped to instruct high-
caste and well-born urban Hindus in English language, Eurocentric morality and the promotion of 
Christian conversion,” (Palsetia, 2006, p.617). Dalits converted to Christianity in large numbers 
because “they associated the value system of the Christian missionaries with the power of the British. 
Some low caste Hindus converted to avoid the stigma of being Pariahs,” (Doniger, 2010, p.584). The 
first Christian conversion is reported to have taken place in 1873 in Sialkot, by a man named Ditt 
(Jodhka, 2009). Then, “to the surprise of the missionaries, Ditt was followed by hundreds of 
thousands of others from lower castes, and Punjab Christianity became a de facto movement for the 
uplift of untouchables, perhaps the first one in modern history,” (Juergensmeyer, 1988, p.181). This 
proves Webster’s point that “the mass movement among Dalits were dalit movements initiated by 
Dalits and sustained by dalit heroism in the face of persecution,” (Webster, 1994, p.70).  
 
How Christianity has helped Dalits escape from caste-based social injustice 
In many ways Christianity has helped dalit communities in India. Whilst Catholic communities in 
India are associated with caste divisions, other Christian denominations such as evangelists/ 
protestants are providing Dalits with a community identity that is completely devoid of caste 
discrimination. One example of this can be seen among the Pentecostal communities. “Pentecostalism 
is, in reality, a highly adaptable social and religious movement, twisting and turning and transforming 
itself to adjust to the realities of a civilisation whose ancient roots continue to sprout new branches 
and leaves,” (Jones, 2009, p. 505). It attracts people from dalit and tribal castes because it provides 
them with a sense of dignity and hope that is non-existent in other sections of Indian society 
(Hedlund, 2000, p.3).  
 
Pentecostalism is rooted in oral culture (Hollenweger, 1997, p.18). This is another reason why it’s so 
popular among Dalits. Most Pentecostals are poor, illiterate and live in slums, where facilities such as 
schooling and medical help are limited (Miller and Yamamori, 2007, pp.173-175). As slum based 
Pentecostal churches are poor and self-funded, and powerless to challenge caste-based discrimination, 
then why are they seen by Dalits to be the solution? Nathaniel Roberts argues that it stems from the 
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pastors’ teachings: As the pastors are themselves from the slums, they “interpret and unconsciously 
adapt the Christian message in the light of their own lifetime experiences in the slum,” (Roberts, 
2017, p. 281). Therefore, the Christian teachings emerging from the pastor’s experiences speak 
directly to the cultural needs of the slum.  
 
To a large extent, Pentecostal dalit converts can live a life completely separate from the social ties of 
Hindu caste. Pentecostals do not view the problem to be caste related, but instead focus on the 
oppressors, who they call ‘the rich’, and themselves, who they self-describe as ‘the poor’, (Roberts, 
2017, p.282). They do not identify as Dalits. Pentecostals understand caste to be “an effect of power, 
whereby the strong monopolize resources that should belong to everyone,” (Roberts, 2017, p.283).  
They believe the sins of the rich lay with how they deny the poor humanity. As Roberts (2016) 
explains, “To be human is to be vulnerable, susceptible to harm. It is also to care instinctively about 
those who are in need, whoever they may be, and to feel called upon to care for them. And finally, to 
be human is to be worthy of being cared for by others. To practice caste is to cut oneself off from 
humanity, simultaneously dehumanising others and oneself,” (Roberts, 2016, p.78). Pentecostalism 
teaches of a way to overcome this injustice. The church teaches that the sins of others can be 
overcome by love and prayer for others. By praying for the wellbeing of others, irrespective of their 
religion, it is believed that the Messiah will raise them and one-day God will bring justice to Earth 
(Roberts, 2017, p.292).  
 
Pentecostal growth has predominantly taken place in the North Tribal belt- in states such as 
Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. Communal violence against Christians 
by Hindutva forces in these states provides evidence of perceived threat of the growing number of 
Pentecostal churches. Despite these attacks slum Christians do not identify themselves as being 
victimised as Christians. Instead they continue to view it as inhumane acts performed by the rich. 
Pentecostal Christians see themselves as liberators, not victims (Roberts, 2017, p.283). Typical 
Pentecostal teaching among these communities is that embracing suffering and refusing to strike back 
is the very means of their salvationŚ “The forms of self-restraint and willingness to suffer that the slum 
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church enjoins in the faithful are not optional but are what is absolutely required of them. This is what 
it takes to tap into the supernatural power of Christ, the only power that can save them and their 
families from misery,” (Roberts, 2017, p.293). This is why Pentecostal Christians do not view 
themselves as Dalits. The term dalit translates as downtrodden and broken, and Pentecostal Christians 
truly believe that they can save themselves, with the help of God. This shows that there are Christian 
denominations that have provided dalit converts with a means of escaping what they previously felt to 
be an inescapable cycle of discrimination and suppression.  
 
Many Dalits have found peace and joy from Christianity as, unlike Hinduism, it teaches of a saviour 
who preached equalityŚ “The same people who were told they weren’t worthy enough to enter a 
Hindu temple are finding that Jesus Christ touched lepers, sinners and other “untouchables” of his day 
and invited them to dine at his table,” (Grady, 2015). Christian missionaries are also working hard to 
improve dalit living conditions in rural areas, and improve education standards. Christian Aid has 
helped “contribute towards poverty reduction by empowering social excluded communities to combat 
discrimination, equality and violations of human rights, both social and systematic,” 
(ChristianAid.org, no date given). They also promote work that enhances the skills of individuals and 
communities to increase their productivity and gain access to land, water and other resources, services 
and support linked to sustainable agriculture and food security (ChristianAid.org, no date given). 
Also, the Christian missions charitable trust (C.M.C.T.) is an organisation that focusses on working to 
transform the lives of people in India without discrimination in caste, creed or race. The C.M.C.T. 
sponsorship program supports the educational needs of over 1500 dalit children in India (Christian 
missions, no date given).  
 
A more specific example of Christianity helping dalit communities can be seen in the work of Raja, 
documented by Grady. He is a young evangelist working in South India who operates a home for 
abandoned girls. He provides food and clothes to neglected orphans and offers counselling to abused 
shop workers. He has a team that use motorcycles to reach remote villages where many of the local 
Hindus are highly resistant to other religions. He has planted churches in 32 communities (Grady, 
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2015). All of these examples show that dalit conversion to Christianity has been successful in terms of 
improving living conditions for Dalits in India. However, the presence of caste amongst Catholic 
India communities has limited how successful conversion to Christianity has been as a response for 
caste-based social injustice. 
 
How Christianity has failed dalit converts 
Not all Christian life includes an escape from India’s caste system for dalit converts. Caste is 
dominant throughout the Catholic communities in India, resulting in Dalits feeling just as isolated and 
exploited as they did prior to converting to Christianity. An example of caste discrimination amongst 
Indian Christians can be seen in Trichy, Tamil Nadu, where the upper castes built a wall across the 
Catholic cemetery, in order to separate dalit burials (Natarajan, 2010). A small socio-political group, 
Periyar Dravidar Kazhagan, are protesting for the removal of the wallŚ “This violates the Indian 
constitution. It is inhuman, it’s humiliating,” (Natarajan, 2010). The Roman Catholic church has 
stated that it does not approve of caste discrimination but, in this instance, it is helpless in resolving 
the issue. This is because the burial ground is owned by private individuals (the upper castes). This 
statement has been challenged by another Christian leader, Father Lourdunathan Yesumariyan, who 
claims that the church does have legal power to remove the wall, due to the recent high court 
judgement that churches have full responsibility over graveyard administers (Natarajan, 2010). It 
should be noted that whilst the church has not removed the wall, they have opened a new graveyard 
that is free from discrimination, in the hopes of easing the caste tensions. Whilst this act shows 
sympathy towards the dalit Christian situation, it is also allowing the caste discrimination to continue. 
Other examples of caste discrimination persisting in Catholic communities were found in studies 
conducted by David Moss. He highlighted that dalit Catholics are prohibited from accessing the 
streets where high caste Christians live, they have restricted access to village temples and teashops, 
and in some cases, they are denied access to common drinking water sources (Moss, 1994).   
 
Tensions between castes in Christian communities have been known to end in violence. In 2015, in 
the southern state of Karnataka, hundreds of Christian Dalits were forced to hide in fields overnight, 
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to escape the rampaging mobs of upper caste Christians (Mondal, 2015). The Dalits tried to register 
the case under the SC/ST atrocities act but the police refused, as Christians lose their scheduled caste 
status when they convert (Mondal, 2015). It is during situations like these that dalit Christians feel 
that they have been let down by Christianity, as they have even less support as Catholic Dalits than 
they did as scheduled castes.  
 
Another example of caste practices continuing in Christianity can be seen in the lack of inter-caste 
marriages among converts. The church encourages this by running magazines that carry matrimonial 
adverts containing specific caste references (Natarajan, 2010). It could be argued that to a certain 
degree, this is a choice among Dalits and other castes, as their partners are more understanding of 
their social and economic situation, if they share the same fate. It is thought by many Christian leaders 
that the intertwining of Christianity and caste is likely to always exist until the government gives dalit 
Christians reservations. Father G. Coscmon Arokiraj argued this point, stating that “For India 
Christians, caste is first, Christ is second. Attitudes in the church won’t change until the government 
helps raise dalit Christians’ social standing through reservation. Mere preaching won’t do,” (Sweas, 
2012). Whilst it is true that preaching is not enough to change the entrenched caste views in Indian 
society, the previous chapter illustrated the reasons why government quotas are not enough to prevent 
this either. The strongest offence that could be used to tackle caste-based discrimination against Dalits 
is a united force of both government reservations and several different forms of dalit activism, all 
working towards the common goal of eradicating caste discrimination. This idea will be discussed in 
more detail in the conclusion of this thesis. The presence of caste among Catholic communities has 
severely limited the success of dalit conversion as a means to escape caste-based social injustice. 
 
The presence of caste among Indian Catholic communities has been the tipping point for a number of 
dalit converts. Whilst earlier in this section showed how the government has been accused of forcing 
reconversions back to Hinduism, there is evidence to suggest that many Dalits are choosing this path. 
In Kerala, 2015, a function organised by the Hindu helpline reconverted 47 dalit Catholics back to 
Hinduism, after the untouchables stated the group has done little to improve their status in India, 
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(Kottayam, 2015). Das, one of the former Catholics who was reconverted at this event, believed that 
“we were Catholics for the sake of the name alone. But we remained poor forever. The church never 
took care of us as we were Dalits.” (Kottayam, 2015). Unfortunately, not only do dalit Catholics 
continue to face caste discrimination, but are also denied education grants and reservations on the 
grounds that Christians do not recognise the caste system. Many Dalits have considered this situation 
and reconverted back to Hinduism as, although the discrimination will not change, at least they will 
have access to employment and education reservations (Kottayam, 2015). 
 
These reconversions have raised controversy, as Christian groups are claiming them to be part of the 
Ghar Vapasi movement initiated by right-wing radical groups. The Archbishop Joseph Powathil states 
Ghar Vapasi events are “intended to spread hatred and anger against Christianity. Many believe this 
movement uses threats and lured, and conversions should be considered ‘forced’,” (Kottayam, 2015). 
Whilst it may be true that Dalits have felt a certain degree of pressure to reconvert, the Hindu helpline 
has provided some evidence that some Catholics have (apparently) converted freely. Parameswaran 
Saburaj, who runs the Hindu helpline, has shown applications signed by Christians seeking help of 
their own free will and choice to reconvert to original faith of their ancestors (Kottayam, 2015). 
However, as the Hindu helpline was created by the V.H.P., it is a Hindu nationalist service, and 
therefore the reliability of this source needs to be questioned. As the V.H.P. is a part of the Sangh 
Parivar, which has focussed on the prevention of dalit conversion, it is possible that the Hindu 
helpline is using Hindutva propaganda, rather than reliable evidence. This makes it difficult to 
determine how many Dalits are reconverting of their own free will, and how many have been 
pressured into it.  
 
Reactions to Dalit conversions 
Dalit conversions to Christianity were met with a much stronger negative reaction than conversions to 
Buddhism. This is mainly due to the fact that Christianity is considered a foreign religion in India, 
whereas Buddhism does have Indian roots. The majority of negative reactions towards Christian 
conversions stem from the R.S.S. and Hindutva ideology. 
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The R.S.S. (Rāṣṭrīya Svayamsēvaka Saṅgha) is a right-wing, Hindu nationalist volunteer organisation, 
that is considered the parenting party of the ruling organisation in Indian government, the B.J.P. 
(Bharatiya Janata Party). The objective of the R.S.S. is to reassert Hindu identity, and to make India a 
Hindu nation and a Hindu culture. The R.S.S. understanding of Hindu culture is: 
A definition of a majoritarian and authoritarian nation where Hindus, under R.S.S. direction, 
will lay down the rules by which the minorities must abide. Its version of Hindu culture is 
inextricably mingled with antagonism against the non-Hindu… the rashtra (nation) is 
conceptually separated from the state and is defined as a cultural idea which embraces a 
community that resides upon a piece of land with which it shares an organic as well as 
emotional relationship (Basu, 1993, p.77). 
 
The concept of Hindutva (Hindu-ness) is the ideology of the R.S.S. and the B.J.P., and is a 
combination of acknowledging the land of Bharatvarsha from Indus to the seas as one’s fatherland as 
well as his holy land i.e the cradle land of one’s religion (Basu, 1993, p.8). The V.H.P. (ViĞva Hindū 
Pariṣada) are also a right-wing Hindu nationalist organisation that are under the umbrella of R.S.S. 
organisations. These groups are collectively known as the Sangh Parivar. This explains why there are 
so many anti-Christian protests and violent attacks occurring in India; The governing power is anti-
Christian in their ideology.  
 
These attacks include the killing of priests, raping of nuns, destruction of Christian schools, churches 
and cemeteries. It’s been argued that government is using anti-Christian propaganda and the 
exploitation of communal difference to mask political and economic motives underlying the attacks. 
The human rights watch has accused the government of once-again failing to protect minorities in 
India. These attacks mainly affect the dalit and tribal communities who have converted to Christianity 
in order to escape abuses under the caste system. It has been stated that “a vested interest in keeping 
their communities in a state of economic dependency is a motivating factor in anti-Christian violence 
and propaganda,” (hrw.org, 1999). There have been claims that eyewitness saw politicians 
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participating in these attacks, but Hindu nationalist leaders continue to portray them as incidents 
instigated by minority communities. The B.J.P. have blamed the violence on an “international 
conspiracy to defame the political party,” (hrw.org, 1999). This is another example of the government 
using minorities in India to mask their political and economic motives.  
 
There are many examples of violence being used as a reaction to Christian conversion. On Christmas 
day in 1998, in Dangs (the smallest district in the state of Gujarat), Christians were badly beaten by 
self-proclaimed ‘patriots’ from the bordering state of Maharashtra, and they demolished nearly 20 
churches (Human rights watch, 1999). This occurred as retaliation to a peaceful protest that Christians 
held on the 4th December in response to several attacks that had previously happened against 
Christians. Between the 25th December and the 3rd January 1999, a further 24 churches, 3 schools, and 
6 houses/shops were burned, destroyed or damaged. Also, on the 8th July 1998, the body of a Christian 
was exhumed by a V.H.P.- led mob just 3 days after his burial and thrown outside the local Methodist 
church (Kang, 1998). In 1997 in Bihar, East India, a Christian priest was stripped naked and paraded 
for 5 kilometres through the streets (UCA news, 1997). On the 25th September 1998 in Jhabua, 
Madhya Pradesh, four nuns were gang raped (CSW.org.uk, 1998). The R.S.S. claimed this was a 
result of “anger of patriotic youth against anti-national forces… the direct result of conversion of 
Hindus to Christianity by Christian priests,” (Melanchthon, 2002, p.104). One of the worst cases 
occurred in Orissa 1999, when an Australian missionary and his two young sons were burnt to death 
in their car (Banerjee, 1999). Also, December 27th 2007 saw a mob of Hindus torch the house of 
Christian leader Radhakant Nayak. On the same day, eleven small churches and prayer houses were 
ransacked (FoxNews, 2007). This is another example of violence directed at foreign missionaries in 
India, as well as Hindu converts.  
 
There have been many anti-Christian campaigns and legislations made to condemn Christians and 
prevent further conversions of Hindus to Christianity. A systematic campaign of lies concerning 
Christians was spread through leaflets and brochures. An example of this can be seen through Bajrang 
Dal (the youth wing of the V.H.P.) launching a Pol Kholo Abhiyan (movement to expose) against 
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Christians, claiming there is an unholy alliance between Christians and Muslims. Besides Christians, 
Muslims have also been a constant target of religion-related violence and discrimination by the B.J.P.. 
Muslims in India were the original “hate-object” of Hindutva (Melanchthon, 2002, p.106). 
Melanchthon explained in her article that, as Hindutva is an ideology of violence, it needs a hate-
object to keep itself alive and must express itself through aggressions and vandalism. Whilst Muslims 
have always been targeted by Hindu nationalists, in recent years Christianity has also become a 
particular focus of concern due to the recent conversions. The Bajrang Dal activists distributed 5 
million pamphlets to expose the “anti-Hindu and anti-national activities of the Christian 
missionaries,” (Melanchthon, 2002, p.104). They believe that the missionaries are out to convert 
Hindus en-masse and wipe out Hinduism from the land of its birth. The V.H.P. have warned society 
that India would be divided if conversion continued. This belief and fear can still be seen even as 
recent as 2008, when the V.H.P. general secretary demanded that foreign missionaries be removed 
from the country (Ians, 2008). 
 
The government’s fear of losing control due to the number of dalit conversions to Christianity can be 
seen through their accusations that Dalits are being forced or bribed into converting. In April, 1954, 
the state government of Madhya Pradesh appointed the “Christian Missionaries activities enquiry 
committee”, who reported that the majority of foreign money received by Christian organisations for 
maintaining educational and medical institutions was spent on converting peopleŚ “The objective is to 
apparently create Christian minority pockets with a view to disrupt the solidarity of the non- Christian 
society and the mass conversion of a considerable section of Adivasis with the ulterior motive is 
fraught with danger to the security of the state.” These findings helped the Hindutva to create a strong 
political force against Christian missionary activities. Also, campaigns in 1998 claimed that 
“Christianity is a foreign religion. Missionaries are here mainly for converting the poor and gullible. 
Conversions are done by inducement, force and fraudulent means. The country will become a 
Christian country as “we” Hindus will be reduced to a minority,” (Christianitytoday, 1998).  
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Whilst conversion was the goal of missionaries during the British Raj, it cannot be argued that they 
are bribing or forcing conversion among the dalit communities in contemporary India. Christian 
leaders have pointed out that when Christians convert, they lose their reservation benefits, which is 
not an enticing offer (Singh 2002). Also, as Christianity is one of India’s poorest communities, it is 
difficult to believe they are in a position to bribe people into joining them (Singh, 2002). Richard 
Howell of the evangelical fellowship of India defends Christianity, and explains that whilst the 
Christian message does often result in conversion, that is not the same as forcing people to convert: 
“The meaning of being a Christian is to give witness We preach Christ’s message of love and 
equality. If you say it leads to conversions, yes it does,” (Singh, 2002). Christians have fought back 
against the allegations of bribery, with retorts that the government use these arguments to hide their 
crimes against Dalits. John Dayal, secretary general of the All India Christian Council (AICC), argues 
that the government should be asking the Dalits why they are converting, rather than accusing 
Christian leadersŚ “Dalits are targeted, raped, murdered and exploited, not by Christian, but by the 
upper caste. Should scavengers and untouchables say with pride, ‘we are Hindus’… why don’t they 
ask Dalits why they’re converting?” (Singh, 2002).  
 
Why is the R.S.S. against conversion? 
As highlighted in the previous section, the Government reports and campaigns over the last 70 years 
show that the Hindutva’s dislike towards other religions and ‘alternative Hinduisms’ is deeply rooted 
in fear. It stems from the desire to have a strong, united country that has one singular identity. During 
the British rule, many high castes developed a ‘Christianised’ or ‘western’ mindset. When the R.S.S. 
started in 1925, towards the end of the British rule, it was part of their vigorous anger towards 
Christians. It is likely that their discontent derives from the traditions of seeing Christianity and white 
missionaries invariable as agents of western imperialism, and Indian Christians as collaborators with 
colonial rule.  
It seems that the Sangh Parivar sees Christianity and these conversions as a threat to Hindutva’s 
growth. It has been highlighted that the Sangh Parivar sees Christian commitments to people’s 
empowerment as the root of the problemŚ “Their preferential option for the poor and the Dalits, their 
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missionary involvement in education and their affirmation of the worth and dignity of the lowest and 
their least,” (Sarkar, 1999, pp.93-94). The V.H.P. propaganda accuses Christian missionaries of 
breeding separatism in order to disintegrate Hindu society. They accuse Christian workers of not 
understanding the complexity of Indian culture. The Sangh Parivar feel the need to protect the status 
quoŚ “the foremost ‘mission’ of Hindutva is to contain this threat, and to stifle the impending 
subaltern ferment inspired at first by the Christian presence in the Indian context,” (Thampu, 1999, 
p.22). In an attempt to gain back the control that the Sangh Parivar think they are losing due to these 
Christian conversions, they launched re-conversion programs for the converted Christians. An 
example of this can be seen in the ‘ghar wapsi’ programme in 2015, where at least fifty people from 
both Christian and Muslims communities were reconverted back to Hinduism (Das, 2015).  
 
It can also be seen that the Sangh Parivar’s anxiety is centred around the education of the minorities 
rather than the conversion of Hindus to Christianity. Evidence of this can be seen when Professor 
Amartya Sen tried to improve conditions in India by prioritizing literacy in education (Canton, 2014). 
The Sangh Parivar interpreted this as an agreement between Sen and Christian missionaries. The 
B.J.P. have not prioritized child education, with the claim that there are not enough funds, though in 
2011 they spent $4.9billion on nuclear weapons (Icanw.org, 2017). It is true that Christians have 
invested in education in India. Nearly 15% of school children in India study in Christian schools and 
10% of university students study in Christian colleges (Melanchthon, 2002, p.107). The Government 
has attempted to counteract the influence of Christian education by introducing a curriculum that 
emphasises value education, religion, spirituality, and Indian identity and culture. This is part of the 
saffronisation drive of the R.S.S.. Saffronisation is a term to describe the Hindu Nationalist policies 
that seek to recall and glorify ancient Hindu cultural history. There have been proposals by the Vidya 
bharati (the educational arm of the R.S.S.) to make Sanskrit compulsory and make school children 
study the Vedas and Upanishads (Baweja, 1998). Despite all of this evidence, the human resource 
development Minister of the Sangh Parivar, Smriti Irani, has vehemently denied the charge of 
saffronizing education (TimesofIndia, 2015a).  
 
69 
 
 
 
Christian Reactions to violence and Proselytising Accusations 
Despite these accusations and violent protests, Christian communities have not retaliated with further 
violence. Their overall responses have emphasised forgiveness towards the Hindu nationalists. 
Christian leaders gave the following statement in regard to the violence they have received:  
 
If persecution is the price we have to pay for our discipleships of the divine master, let us be 
ready to face it… The use of muscle power and violence is a sign of spiritual and moral 
bankruptcy. We must fight with the power of love, with spiritual power, prayer and penance 
with courage and trust in the lord (Melanchthon, 2002, p.109).  
 
Christian leaders have issued statements condemning the attacks and called upon the government to 
protect the safety of minorities. Bishop Theodore Mascarenhas, secretary general of Catholic Bishop’s 
conference of India, stated that “we are distressed that people have begun taking the law into their 
own hands in various matters. This is not good for the country and not good for social and religious 
harmony. We call upon the prime minister to rein in these unruly forces and restore India’s image,” 
(Akarra, 2017).  
 
The National Commission for Minorities (NCM) brokered a meeting between Christian leaders and 
the V.H.P. on July 11th 2000, to remove discord and misgivings between the two communities (Basu, 
2000). They have also resolved to continue working among the poor even if these attacks continue. 
Christians in India have been seen having public gatherings to pray and affirm their faith in Christ 
(AFP, 2015).  
 
The church has not reacted to the violence targeting dalit Christians, which brings about the question 
of whether or not their Christian identities are overriding their Indian/dalit identities. If this is true 
then, although they are Christian, they are bereft of compassion for their neighbour, which is a 
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fundamental Christian teaching. On the other hand, it can be argued that the peaceful reaction from 
the Christians in India has only strengthened their position. Their forgiveness and non-judgemental 
attitude are some of the reasons that attracted Dalits to converting to Christianity in the first place. By 
remaining peaceful through these negative times, they are portraying a united Christian front, and 
perhaps showing Dalits that haven’t converted yet and want to, that they need not fear violence at the 
hands of Christianity. 
 
How successful has Christian conversion been as a response for caste-based social injustice? 
The success of dalit conversion to Christianity can only be measured by separating how effective the 
different denominations have been. Catholic communities are still caste-based, due to the number of 
upper caste Christians. This has prevented Catholic conversion from being a successful response to 
the social injustice that Dalits face.  
 
Pentecostal dalit converts hold a stronger position for fighting caste discrimination. These 
communities offer Dalits almost a clean break from caste, and converts have even rejected the term 
‘dalit’, as they feel liberated and no longer oppressed. Pentecostalism has provided Dalits with a 
strong sense of community, and a means of salvation that they can acquire themselves through love 
and prayer. Christian activist groups and charities, particularly evangelists, are also heavily involved 
in organisations that help to improve the living conditions, poverty and education among dalit 
communities.  
 
As the situations between denominations are so vastly different, particularly in their treatment towards 
Dalits, it is difficult to determine whether Christian conversion can be classed as a fully successful 
method for Dalits to use to combat social injustice. Pentecostal communities have been successful in 
providing Dalits with a way of escaping the label of ‘dalit’; however, they still feel the effects of 
suppression in the fact that they remain in such dire conditions of poverty. Also, whilst to a certain 
extent the current national government turns a blind eye to Buddhist conversion as it is considered to 
be a part of Hinduism, they are fully opposed to Christian conversion. This makes it very difficult for 
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Christianity to be a perfect solution to dalit discrimination, especially when they are denied 
reservations once they convert to Christianity, but in some communities, it has provided Dalits with a 
certain degree of relief from the entrenched caste perceptions of Dalits.  
 
Conclusion 
This section will examine the successfulness of conversion as a whole, and compare it to the success 
of affirmative action. Conversion has been partially successful as a response to caste-based social 
injustice: Buddhism provided many Dalits with a means of political protest, and Christian 
organisations have fought hard to combat the lack of reservations by helping improve the living 
conditions of Dalits. Overall, conversion to Buddhism has formed a stronger response to dalit 
injustice, as it provides a united interpretation of Buddhism and the rights of equality that Neo-
Buddhist converts are fighting for. Whilst some Christian denominations, such as the Pentecostal 
communities, provide Dalits with a certain degree of relief from caste discrimination, there is a 
divided view among the Christian communities around the treatment of Dalits. Buddhism has also 
allowed Dalits to be considered a separate identity and yet still benefit from government reservations, 
whilst even Christian communities that feel separated from caste discrimination, are still stripped of 
their reservation rights. 
 
However, just like affirmative action, it has not been completely successful in eradicating caste-based 
discrimination. One of the problems with affirmative action is eligibility, and how some Dalits dread 
receiving the label of minority because it only increases discrimination against them. To a certain 
extent, conversion can solve that problem. One of the reasons Dalits converted was to give them a 
chance to hide their dalit identity. Whilst affirmative action helped to give Dalits a platform to voice 
their grievances, Ambedkar has helped to boost this confidence even more among Dalits. Buddhist 
converts are the most common among dalit protests. Unfortunately, most Roman Catholic converts do 
not share this confidence. For the majority of cases, they still live in fear of the upper castes. This is 
where it is clear that conversion has fallen into the same pitfalls as affirmative action when attempting 
to combat social injustice. It is the entrenched prejudices of Hindu society that have prevented 
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conversion from being successful. Most Roman Catholic communities are bound by superstitions of 
pollution, in the same way that many are against allowing Dalits to have places in employment, as 
they are considered polluted. At the same time, the government is trying to prevent conversion 
because of the Hindutva ideology that Hinduism is the only true religion of India. All of these 
problems and discrepancies are centred around the problem of education that Dalits should have 
completely equal rights to all other castes. It is doubtful that India will reform the education system to 
teach these equalities, particularly with the current accusations by the Congress party that the 
government is ‘saffronizing’ education (Times of India, 2015c). This shows that Ambedkar was right 
in his position that it is impossible for Dalits to ever have equality whilst being a part of Hinduism. 
This thought process could perhaps be taken a step further and suggest that Dalits will always be 
subject to discrimination in India, despite what religion they are. Evidence in this section has shown 
that, even when Dalits convert, they are still affected. The only solution to this problem would be if 
Dalits left India altogether, which is not a realistic solution. As long as Hindus continue to believe that 
Dalits are impure and polluted, caste discrimination will still continue to exist in Indian society.  
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Chapter 3: 
Dalit women’s activism 
This chapter is focussing on the treatment of dalit women as one form of social injustice that Dalits 
experience. Studies have shown that caste-based social exclusion is more acutely felt by dalit women 
than by dalit men, because the women experience greater ‘untouchability’ and ill-treatment, from 
dominant caste women and men (Shah et al, 2006). Dalit women experience discrimination in the 
form of caste-based exploitation by upper castes, as well as patriarchal discrimination within their 
own castes. This chapter will explore the daily lives of dalit women, and the different methods of 
activism that dalit women are using to achieve equality in society. These effects of these methods, 
such as joining NGOs and using microcredit loans, will be analysed, illustrating how they have 
affected their positions in both positive and negative ways. It will also explore the relationship 
between dalit women and women of other castes, and how this alters the effectiveness of dalit 
women’s attempts for upward social mobility. I will also examine how two dalit communities 
received access to the same sources of help, and yet yielded completely different results. This chapter 
will discuss the reasons behind the relative success of one dalit community compared to the other. 
Finally, I will analyse the effects of dalit social mobility on the dalit domestic household, and how 
dalit women are now facing similar patriarchal oppression to upper-caste women.  
 
Daily lives of dalit women 
The daily lives and treatment of dalit women need to be examined, in order to understand the effects 
of upward social mobility and discrimination by caste. As dalit women are victims of three types of 
exploitation (class, caste and patriarchy), they have been termed ‘thrice Dalits’ by dalit woman 
activist, Ruth Manorama (Grey, 2010, p.13). Before exploring the daily lives of dalit women, it assists 
in understanding their daily struggles, and the various methods they have used to combat their 
oppression in both the community and domestic environment.  
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The treatment of dalit women is inextricably entwined with dalit men and their relationships with 
upper castes. After British colonialism and the outlaw of untouchability, Dalits had an increasing 
awareness of their human rights. This led to tensions brewing between upper-caste land owners, who 
felt that Dalits were stepping out of place, and dalit labourers. This resulted in many atrocities against 
Dalits, most of which targeted women and children, as a way of ‘teaching Dalits a lesson’. An 
example of this occurred in Kilvenmani, Tamil Nadu, in December 1968, where 16 women and 23 
children were burned alive (Teltumbde, 2017, p.62). On top of these atrocities, dalit women also 
suffer domestic violence as a result of the patriarchal caste system. Dalit men suffer relative 
powerlessness in society, which they often compensate for by lording it over their women at home.  
 
Everyday violence 
Violence against dalit women is a major problem in Indian society. Violent attacks against dalit 
women occur on a daily basis, and are not considered to be serious issues by upper castes. This 
attitude originated in the Code of Manu, where the killing of a dalit woman is justified as a minor 
offence, equal to the killing of an animal (G.O.I., 2007, p.2). National figures showed that in 2000, 
23,742 cases of atrocities against Dalits were registered, and it is estimated that 75% of these were 
against women (Grey, 2010, p. 43). Grey argues that “the reality is that Dalit women suffer violence 
on a spectrum ranging from insults, accusations of low morals and loose living, sexual harassment of 
many sorts, to beatings and even gang rapes. In fact, when a dalit woman is raped it is often not called 
“rape” and it is not reported as such,” (Grey, 2010, p. 44). Less than 5% of attacks of violence make it 
to court (Harding, 2001). This highlights the fear of women to intimidation and the refusal of police to 
follow up the cases. Police in India are known for their caste prejudices, and for often punishing 
Dalits who ask for their help. Teltumbde argued that, “The police, the main agency of the 
administration interfacing with ordinary people, play an outright anti-dalit role in every caste 
conflict,” (Teltumbde, 2017, p.65). This shows that dalit women have no definitive place where they 
can find safety from violence and other forms of discrimination. Grey reported how pregnant women 
have been attacked by police, and miscarriages caused when they’ve appealed to the police for help 
(Grey, 2010, pp.46-47). Upper caste use violence to vent frustrations regarding the growing upward 
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social mobility of Dalits. As The Hague Convention of Women’s Rights in 2006 argues, the 
“perpetrators enjoy virtual immunity from persecution for violence against dalit women, as the police, 
who themselves often harbour caste prejudices, wilfully neglect to enforce the law,” (The Hague, 
2003).  
 
It can also be argued that the Code of Manu condones violence within Hindu marriages. ‘Imam hi 
sarw’ has been translated as ‘It is the duty of all husbands to exert control over their wives. Even 
physically weak husbands must strive to control their wives’ (Harad, 2016). However, although the 
traditions of this text are deeply rooted in Indian society, it is important to remember the age of these 
texts, and therefore, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the code of Manu is the main cause of 
contemporary domestic violence. The code of Manu has also been questioned over how much 
influence it had over actual conduct. Manu is a Brahmanical view of how things should be in 
Brahmanical ideology, but it is “unclear of how accurately it reflects social reality,” (Flood, 1996, 
p.66). It is also important to highlight that this is only one translation of the code of Manu. The 
section that this translation has been taken from, Manusmrti 9.6, has also been translated as, “even 
weak husbands (must) strive to guard their wives,” (Manu, 2005, p.190). This portrays a slightly 
different message, although ‘guarding’ implies a patriarchal attitude and can be thought to imply a 
degree of control. Valerie Mason- John argued that rape within marriage is actually quite common: 
“Often men force their wives to have sexś the husband feels it’s his right and duty because she is his 
wife. He may beat her and she rarely says anything to anyone about it, because that would bring 
shame upon her,” (Mason-John, 2008, pp.57-58). India’s N.C.R.B. highlighted that, in 2013, 118,866 
cases of domestic violence were recorded (Pandey, 2014). This emphasises that domestic violence is a 
serious, widespread issue across India. 
 
Caste-based violence against Dalits is an equally serious issue. Gabriele Dietrich suggests that 
“against such violence, the men of the dalit community can often not ‘protect their women’ and it is 
therefore perceived as a collective weakness and vulnerability,” (Dietrich, 2001, p.204). Raping dalit 
women is seen as a way of humiliating dalit men, who are powerless to retaliate (Webster, 1995, 
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p.17). As explored later in this chapter, rape is associated with dishonour. An example of caste Hindu 
backlash against dalit women can be seen in Karnataka, where upper castes raided a dalit household, 
physically assaulted to son, and raped the teenage daughter in front of the village’s statue of 
Ambedkar (Seenarine, 1996).  
 
Devadasi sacrifice 
Devadasis, meaning servant of the God, is the sacrifice of young dalit girls to the local temple goddess 
and is a strong aspect of dalit women identity. Burnad Fatima highlights the appeal of Mathamma 
sacrifice to dalit communities, as there is a lack of medical services, and families sacrifice their 
daughters to the temples, in the hopes that the goddess will cure them. In the cases where the children 
do get better, the child is then married to the goddess, and belongs to the temple, where they dance to 
earn a living (Fatima, 2002).  
 
Devadasis has become an issue for dalit women activists and feminist activists in recent years, as it is 
believed that the girls are often exploited sexually by upper caste men. Although the practice was 
outlawed in 1982, as many as 15,000 girls in rural areas are dedicated to god each year (Grey, 2010, 
p.50). Poverty is the main reason behind this practice. Dalits sell their daughters to the temples, not 
only for the money, but also in the hopes of providing their daughters with a stable and safe lifestyle. 
This devotional practice, and both the positive and negative effects it has, will be explored in greater 
detail further in this chapter.  
 
Daily work and employment 
Violence is not the only characteristic of Indian society that affects the daily lives of dalit women. The 
lives of dalit women are very difficult on a day-to-day basis. They are responsible for the survival of 
their family. This not only includes paid labour, to ensure their family has enough money to survive, 
but also the daily household chores. Robert Deliege describes the work of dalit womenŚ “The women 
work as hard as the men, without counting the household chores, which they must do as well,” 
(Deliege, 1999, p.129). These jobs can prove to be difficult to complete, as dalit women face 
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untouchability practices and discrimination related to the simplest of tasks, such as the collection of 
water (Mangubhai and Capraro, 2015, p.264).  
 
The paid labour of women is equally difficult and often fraught with danger. Dalit women are treated 
as inferior to men and exploited economically in the workplace, as they receive lower wages to 
perform the same tasks (Shrivastava and Tanchangya, 2015, p.182). Women also face a vulnerability 
for sexual harassment on the way to and from, or during work (Grey, 2010, p.33). As mentioned 
earlier, rape is a huge problem in dalit society, and it often occurs in the dalit workplace. In 2013, 
2072 cases of rape were recorded, according the National Crime Record Bureau (N.C.R.B., 2013, 
p.430). 
 
For many dalit women, particularly in the urban context, manual scavenging is the way they earn their 
living. This is the “term used to describe the job of removing human excrement from dry toilets and 
sewers using basic tools such as thin boards, buckets and baskets, lined with sacking, carried on the 
head. Manual scavengers earn around 60p a month,” (Ramaswamy, 2005, p.4). Over 95% of manual 
scavengers are women, as men are becoming occupationally mobile, and have increased opportunities 
that offer more money outside of the villages (Sarfarez, 2017). This shows the continuing gender 
discrimination, as not only are women left with the humiliating and degrading jobs whilst the men 
socially progress, but they are also exploited in regards to wages. Women earn as little as ten rupees 
each month for scavenging, whilst men earn up to 300 rupees cleaning sewer tanks on any given day 
(Sarfarez, 2017).  
 
Non-government organisations (NGO), Self-help groups (SHGs) and the relationship between 
dalit and non-dalit women in India 
SHGs and micro-credit loans have had one of the biggest impacts on dalit women’s activism in India. 
These groups aim to bring women together to claim their rights collectively. Unfortunately, that is not 
always the case. The practical implementation of SHG is very complex, and the different identities of 
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women often serve to divide them rather than unify. The NGO (non-government organisations) staff 
use these differences and exploit them for their own purposes. 
 
Since the early 2000s, providing a platform for women to join together and help each other has been a 
policy promoted by the Indian government with the SHG programs. These SHG took the form of 
savings and credit groups, of between 12-20 women. Sometimes these groups linked together and 
formed larger groups known as ‘federations’. An example of this can be seen in 1980, when the Rural 
Women’s Liberation Movement (RWLM) affiliated with the NGO, the society for rural Education 
and Development (SRED). Around 15,000 women formed this collective (Anandhi, 2017, p.109).  
These groups are focussed on promoting women’s livelihoods. The 2006 report of the working group 
on poverty elimination stated that, “It is well recognised that SHGs are appropriate grass-root level 
institutions for attacking multiple deprivation,” (G.O.I., 2006, p.20). According to the Indian 
government, these groups address some of the most neglected deprivations of the poor, such as health 
security, have contributed to the eradication of child labour and spread awareness about AIDS (G.O.I., 
2006, p.45). 
 
Despite this report, over the past few years a range of investigative studies have raised serious doubts 
regarding the effectiveness of SHGs in India. SHGs believe that local communities and women’s 
communities in particular, can empower the poor, strengthen grassroots democracy and bridge the gap 
between local and national institutions (Guerin and Kumar, 2016, p.161). It seems that, in India, poor 
women are expected to show a natural willingness to assist development projects. But, as many 
women live in fear of violence and other forms of discrimination, it is unlikely they would risk the 
social and domestic backlash that is associated with political activities. These punishments, that often 
occur in their domestic setting, are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Rao argues that, 
whilst women’s participation in SHG was thought to promote solidarity and trust, the evidence 
suggests that, in reality, it is a technique that shifts the costs and responsibilities of rural development 
onto poor women (Rao, 2008).  
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As discussed previously, SHG provide women with microcredit loans, allowing Dalits to escape from 
the control of the upper-castes. These loans are intended for the use of starting up small businesses, 
but this is rarely the case. Kalpana (2011) argues that microcredit is mostly spent on consumption and 
thus fails to promote self-employment, even if it sometimes reduces vulnerability (Kalpana, 2011, 
p.56). Garikipati argues that, although SHG are intended to help women in India, microcredit loans 
benefit males in households rather than women, as they have very little control over household assets 
(Garikipati, 2008, p.2621). This is not always true. Often, dalit women have the control of household 
finances, but they have to use the money to ensure the survival of their family and the payment of 
debts. This can become difficult, as will be seen in the final section of this chapter, when upward 
social dalit men expect the money to be spent on ensuring the upkeep of their family’s new social 
status (Anandhi, 2017, p.107). 
 
Microcredit loan eligibility 
SHGs are local groups that are subject to local political factions. As a result, they “reproduce pre-
existing inequalities along the various social divides, such as gender, class, caste, religious and 
political affiliation,” (Guerin and Kumar, 2017, p.161). These inequalities are apparent among the 
divisions of microcredit loans. The criteria for loan allocation varies significantly depending on caste 
identity. Although NGOs on paper exist to assist Dalits with social uplift, in reality many NGOs 
actually worsen gender and caste bI.A.S.es. This, in turn, affects the relationships between dalit and 
non-dalit women, as they are not treated equally. This discrimination and identification by caste 
creates mistrust on both sides.  
 
Examples of these discriminations can be seen in the eligibility of loan application. In order to be 
eligible, dalit women have to submit to various NGO demands, including free favours and services to 
the upper castes running the NGOs. It also involved compulsory participation by dalit women in 
various public events, whilst attendance was not compulsory for women from other castes (Guerin 
and Kumar, 2017, p.179). Also, the selection criteria targeted women who were physically attractive, 
well dressed and comfortable to talk in public. This was to ensure appeal to the influential male 
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visitors that financially supported their organisations (Guerin and Kumar, 2017, pp.175-176). This 
deeply bI.A.S.ed selection criteria created a huge disadvantage for dalit women, as they were often 
seen as unpresentable, and penalised them by only offering smaller loans, whilst the entrepreneurship 
loans were given almost solely to the non-dalit women members. This is extremely unfair, as most 
often dalit women are in the greatest need of financial help. In this way, microcredit loans have failed 
to help the financial burdens of dalit women.  
 
Interestingly, it is not only dalit women who have suffered due to this process of allocation. Some 
non-dalit women complained about these requirements, as their caste norms required them to not have 
contact with unknown men, and remain in their houses. It also caused some husbands to become 
suspicious about their wife’s behaviour (Guerin and Kumar, 2017, p.176). This links to the idea of 
women being central to the family’s honour, as contact with unknown men would make women seem 
promiscuous and dishonourable.  
 
Relations between women were further agitated by the NGO policy that prevented dalit field workers 
from having any communication with their non-dalit women members. The NGO enforced this policy 
because it was felt it would be too degrading for non-dalit women to have to deal with dalit staff. 
Non-dalit women claim it is almost impossibly humiliating to take loans from Dalits (Guerin and 
Kumar, 2017, p.174). This does not help to create equality between Dalits and other caste women, but 
is instead enforcing caste divisions.  
 
The positive outcomes of NGOs 
Despite the existence of caste-divisions among some NGOs, in many ways they have assisted dalit 
women in fighting oppression. Dalit Mahila Samiti (D.M.S.) is an organisation of dalit women 
working in the Bundelkhand region of Uttar Pradesh. Founded in 2003, D.M.S. has set specific goals 
to help dalit women, including the promotion of leadership of local women, the protesting of all forms 
of violence against women, and ensuring that government scheme benefits are reached by all eligible 
Dalits (Andharia, 2008). They have been rather successful in meeting their goals. D.M.S. is involved 
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in the struggle of dalit women against the practice of untouchability by organising play performances 
in the villages, questioning untouchability in order to raise dalit feminist consciousness. They are also 
working towards ending purity/pollution practices, by encouraging Dalits and upper castes to share 
meals. They have been seeking to end violence by supporting victims and reporting cases to the 
police, ensuring justice for dalit communities in Uttar Pradesh. An example of this could be seen in 
2003, when they extended support for justice when a pregnant dalit woman was assaulted by upper 
caste women (Shrivastava and Tanchangya, 2015, pp.185-186). 
 
The Christian Aid programme has also been working to support dalit women through the violence 
they face. The Dalit Stree Shakti (D.S.S.) programme has been working since 2005 to organise dalit 
women. It works with women to devise strategies for change, boosting self-confidence and self-
esteem as dalit women (Mangubhai and Capraro, 2015, p.269). They support women to take up cases 
of caste-based violence and domestic violence. In cases of domestic violence, the D.S.S. set up 
counselling sessions for both parties. If this fails, then the woman is supported to take legal 
interventions. They monitor the onG.O.I.ng cases, supporting victims to pursue justice and not to be 
pressured into compromises with the perpetrator (Mangubhai and Capraro, 2015, p.269). However, 
considering the violent backlash that dalit women often face when reporting cases of domestic 
violence, the provided counselling sessions may actually place these women in more danger.  
 
Nude worship and conflicting interests 
Despite the good intentions of these programmes, their help is not always appreciated in dalit 
communities. In 1986, activists of the Dalit Sangharsh Samithi and the women’s collective, Manavi, 
tried to stop the annual nude worship bettaliseve in the Chandragutti temple. The ritual involves 
bathing in the Varada river and then running naked to the temple, about 5 kilometres away (Tharu, 
2014, p.152) The activists planned a major intervention to dissuade the women, and to use the force of 
the state if necessary to prevent the ritual from taking place. Krishnappa, a leader of the D.S.S., 
claimed that these types of practices are “uncultured and barbarous” (Epp, 1997, p.332). But the dalit 
worshippers taking part in the ritual forced the reformers to retreat, by turning violentŚ They “beat up 
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some of the social workersś cameras were broken and policewomen were stripped,” (Radhika, 2012, 
p.310). This shows that some Dalits are happy to continue their traditional forms of worship, as rituals 
such as these are encompassed in dalit identity. Therefore, the attempts made to reform these rituals 
by other upwardly mobile dalit communities are both misguided and insensitive. 
 
All of these examples show a varied response to SHGs and NGOs as a response to the social injustice 
that women face. To a certain degree, they have helped to provide these women with an awareness to 
their rights, and a confidence to fight for these rights. Some programmes have attempted to offer 
support to victims of violence, where the local police so often fail to do so. However, it may be the 
case that this support causes further problems for dalit women, and places them in danger of more 
violence. Also, it has been highlighted that whilst the intention of microcredit loans is to relieve dalit 
women of some of their debt, and to provide them with relief from being financially dependent on the 
upper caste, it has put them at a disadvantage in other ways. Not only are these loans difficult to 
receive, due to the allocation criteria, but they have also enforced the caste divide between dalit and 
upper caste women. In some respects, this is the worst outcome that Dalits could face, as it has 
increased the social injustice and discrimination that they now face in daily village life.  
 
Honour and the revitalisation of patriarchy in dalit communities 
For the majority of cases, the discrimination that dalit women face is linked in some way to ‘honour’. 
Honour is an integral part of India’s perception of women, as the modesty of women is seen to reflect 
the honour of an Indian household. As the honour of women is such an important reflect of families as 
a whole, an increase in control over dalit women’s actions can be seen in upwardly mobile dalit 
communities. Welchman and Hossain explain the understanding of honour is “vested in male control 
over women and specifically women’s sexual conductŚ actual, suspected or potential,” (Welchman 
and Hossain, 2005, p.4). 
 
George notes that “individual honour is usually subsumed to family and religious or caste community 
honour,” (George, 2006, p.37). As this is the case, “only public actions can cause dishonour,” (Derne, 
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1995, p.153). This is why upper caste women as kept inside of their homes, to eliminate the 
possibility of being considered dishonourable and immoral. Dalit families who have increased social 
mobility seem to place an emphasis on family honour, which in some ways reflects upper caste 
traditions of honour. It is likely that this is because these Dalits want to prove they are equal to other 
caste families in all ways, and to shed the stigma of pollution and unworthiness that is associated with 
being a dalit. Still enforces this viewŚ “When economic circumstances allow it, Dalits adopt/and/or 
enforce a gender ideology similar to that of higher status groups,” (Still, 2011, p.1128). 
 
Honour and the lack of autonomy 
This is why increased social mobility is not necessarily a positive thing, in regards to the treatment of 
dalit women. Srinivas noted that a rise in social status amongst dalit communities has resulted in 
harshness towards dalit women (Srinivas, 1956, p.484). An example of these changes can be seen in 
the dalit community of a South Indian village called Nampally. Overall Dalits residing in this village 
are in a much better position compared to most rural Dalits in India. Most dalit women are occupied 
with agricultural work, whilst the men have gained independence by finding work in the city. The 
women are also active in village politics and knowledgeable of their rights (Still, 2017, p.194). This 
gives the impression that the dalit women have benefitted from their community’s upward social 
mobility. As Dyson and Moore argue, lower caste women have more autonomy than their upper caste 
counterparts (Dyson and Moore, 1983). However, this increased mobility has actually decreased the 
dalit women’s autonomy, and placed them under much stricter control by their husbands. Dalit men 
have begun trying to make their women appear more respectable, by seeking to withdraw their wives 
from farm labour (Still, 2017, p.194). They are also preventing them from engaging in political 
activities, as female activists are considered ‘hussies’ and ‘forward women’ (Gorringe, 2017. P.264). 
By removing their wives and daughters from these public situations, dalit men hope to show their 
family as ‘honourable’, and nothing like previous caste judgements that Dalits are polluted and have 
no honour. This is known as Dalits “adopting a bourgeois housewife ethic and Hindu ‘seclusion’ 
identity,” (Still, 2000, p.79). 
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In many ways, housewification can be considered a positive thing for dalit women. They are no 
longer bound to discriminating upper caste, and do not need to suffer through hard manual labour for 
little pay. Heyer argues that investing time in their home and children, rather than labour, can prove 
hugely beneficial to dalit families, as they are likely to have better health (Heyer, 2014). However, 
dalit women who have the privilege of being a housewife, also suffer from a complete lack of 
independence.  
 
Dalit marriage and sexual assault 
Employment is not the only area of life that socially mobile dalit men are controlling. Before upward 
social mobility, dalit marriages used to be more flexible (Deliege, 1997, p.183). Often young dalit 
men and women would choose their partner, and then their parents would contrive an “arranged” 
marriage later (Still, 2014, p.138). Now, in socially mobile dalit communities, there is an increased 
emphasis of arranged marriages and dowry- practices that are traditionally upper caste (Anandhi, cited 
in Gopinath, 2005). This is, once again, not necessarily an improvement for dalit women. As 
Deshpande argues, dowry and arranged marriages further decrease the autonomy of women and 
reinforce patriarchal tendencies (Desphande, 2002). This decreased autonomy can lead to difficulties 
in filing for divorce or escaping from abusive husbands (Still, 2017, p.202). Parry enforces this 
argument, stating that the decline in divorce rates amongst dalit communities goes hand in hand with 
gender inequality among Dalits (Parry, 2001, p.788).   
 
However, withdrawing dalit women from agricultural labour also ensures that women are not sexually 
accessible to upper caste males. This can be viewed as a necessary precaution, as the sexual 
exploitation of dalit women has been so normalised historically that upper-caste men have viewed the 
bodies of their dalit women labourers as their right (Kannabiran and Lalitha, 1989, p.182). As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, rape and sexual harassment is a powerful form of caste domination. 
Violence and rape occurs frequently in villages where upward mobility is taking place, as “groups 
assert their status by seeking to humiliate or shame the other,” (Gorringe, 2017, p.259). As Pandian 
explains, “Vanniyars are armed with a heightened sense of caste pride to establish their difference and 
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superiority over the Dalits,” (Pandian, 2000, p.504). As the Dalits increase their social mobility, this 
angers the upper castes who believe they are superior to the Dalits, and therefore violent retaliations 
occur. This is argued by Anandhi, Jeyaranjan and Krishnan, who believe that “the assertion of Dalits 
has contributed to the unmaking of upper caste masculinity in the public domain,” (Anandhi, 
Jeyaranjan and Krishnan, 2002, p.4404). This makes it understandable that Dalits wish to protect their 
women from these attacks, but it is also an attempt to protect the dalit community’s honour as well. 
This is because sexual exploitation is taken as a direct affront to reputation of dalit castes as a whole 
(Still, 2017, p.203). Rape and sexual abuse “instantly strips the woman, her family and her caste 
group of honour while simultaneously emasculating her husband and the men of her caste and kinship 
groups who have been shown to have failed to protect her,” (Baghel, 2009, p.216-217).  
 
The pressures of withholding their family’s ‘honour’ and the tensions between upper castes and Dalits 
in these situations, also leads to increased domestic violence. Rogers argues that the reason for this is 
that “dalit men resort to a form of hyper-masculinity in response to their marginality which valorises 
male physical strength and control over women,” (Rogers, 2008, p.80). This is a huge issue for dalit 
women as, not only are they in danger of constant abuse at home, but their increased control by the 
dalit men also prevent them from seeking help from the programmes and SHGs that are put in place 
for this very reason. Gorringe highlights this as the paradox of contemporary dalit mobilisationŚ “It 
inspires women ad brings them out of their homes and villages, but then fails to address the social 
problems that they raise,” (Gorringe, 2017, p. 262). Even on the larger scale of Indian politics, 
Dietrich points out that “one of the main issues that dalit women activists encounter is domestic 
abuse, and this is one of the key silences in most dalit politics,” (Dietrich, 2001). This is because dalit 
parties wish to better dalit lives by elevating their social status, but they remain reluctant to address 
the internal problems of patriarchy and gender discrimination, (Gorringe, 2017, p. 265). In this way, 
dalit political parties and upward social mobility has not assisted dalit women in their battle for social 
justice. 
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In conclusion, an increase in social mobility is tied to an increased awareness of family ‘honour’. This 
has led to a decrease in the autonomy of dalit women and a loss of dalit women’s identity. The 
attributes that distinguish them as dalit women, such as agricultural labour and freedom to walk about 
the villages, are being controlled by the socially mobile men who wish to preserve their slightly 
elevated social status. Although these changes have been positive in helping to minimise the risk of 
sexual abuse against dalit women by upper caste men, it does nothing to prevent the domestic abuse 
they continue to suffer at home. In a way, this highlights that, as dalit women obtain a slight escape 
from discrimination in the community, they face double the discrimination at home, as they are 
prevented from having any escape from abusive and controlling husbands. This concern with honour 
has also led dalit communities to mimic beliefs and practices of upper castes, the same beliefs they 
despise for the inequality they place upon Dalits. This shows the complexity of the struggle for 
equality that dalit women face.  
 
The effects of upward social mobility on the lives of dalit women 
An example of how dalit women have used social mobility as a means of fighting caste oppression 
can be found in the state of Tamil Nadu. In the village of Valluvapuram, there are two dalit 
communities, the Adidravidar Dalits and the Arundhathiyar Dalits. Although both of these dalit 
communities live in the same village, they have had very different experiences of social mobility. The 
Arundhathiyars have remained trapped in tied agricultural labour relations with the Naidus (dominant 
caste), due to their longstanding debts (Anandhi, 2017, p.99). They also continue to practice the 
dedication ritual of sacrificing/marrying their daughters to Mathamma, the village goddess (Anandhi, 
2013). This further enforces their dependence on the upper caste, as the Mathamma girls become 
sexually available to the Naidu men, as the men are ‘patrons’ of the Mathamma temple. This results in 
them being identified as ‘sacred prostitutes’.  
 
Whilst the Arundhathiyar caste are unhappy with the caste discrimination that they face at the hands 
of the Naidus, they have not refuted the traditional caste practices. The Arundhathiyar men have 
defended the Mathamma dedication practice, claiming that the girls are not involved in temple 
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prostitution, and dedication is seen to be part of the cultural identity of the Arundhathiyars (Anandhi, 
2017, p.101).  
 
In contrast, the Adidravidas Dalits are very upwardly mobile in their daily lives. They have used 
SHGs and NGOs to create an independent economic situation, separate from the Naidus. Also, the 
Adidravidars are known for protecting and defending their women regularly (Anandhi, 2017, p.102). 
This has resulted in decreased sexual vulnerability of Adidravidas women. For the majority, 
Adidravidar men and women are completely independent from the upper castes (Ong, 1999, p.53). 
Adidravidar women have accomplished this upward social mobility with the assistance of NGOs, 
such as the Rural Women’s Liberation Movement (RWLM), commonly known as the sangam, and 
the Society for Rural Education and Development (REDS), a non- government women’s organisation. 
The REDS aim is to “mobilise the innocent and exploited women to empower them through 
systematic approach with the help of various government agencies” (redsngo.org, 2017). The Sangem 
has been very effective in helping to mobilise the Adidravidar women and empowering them to fight 
for equality. E. Connolly argues that it has allowed them to display a new dalit politics of ‘becoming’. 
By definition, a politics of becoming is at work when a group that suffers cultural stigma attempts to 
rework its identity, that was imposed on it by various institutions. In this instance, it’s referring to the 
caste system. Connolly argues that the endured suffering opens up possibilities for a new political 
movement (Connolly, 1999, p.51). 
 
Sangem attempts to ban the Devadasi rituals 
The Sangem was even successful at encouraging women to stand together and form a ‘collective’, as 
the mobilised Adidravidar women tried to assist the socially oppressed Arundathiyar Mathamma 
women. They fought to ban the dedication ritual, and for the Naidu patrons to provide an adequate 
and respectable livelihood for Mathamma girls. The RWLM also provided Mathamma women with 
entrepreneurial training in order to start their own small businesses. Devadasis dedication was made 
illegal in 1947, under the Tamil Nadu devadasis Act. Under this act, dedicating girls to Hindu temples 
is forbidden (Sithannan, 2006, p.21). Despite this law, Devadasi dedication is still practiced among 
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dalit communities. The Supreme court in Karnataka has described the practice as an ‘evil’ done to 
women. The court advocate, V.K. Biju, contended that neither were the police enforcing the law nor 
were the state government properly utilising funds allocated for the rehabilitation of the girl who were 
pushed into the Devadasi system (Rajagopal, 2016). This shows that the Mathamma girls who feel 
discrimination against and are sexually exploited require the help of the NGOs, as they cannot rely on 
the police or their community’s men to put a stop to it. Many Mathamma girls were pleased with this 
assistance, as these actions gave them self-respect and challenged discrimination. It has been claimed 
that the Mathammas have faced violence within their caste, when they tried to claim their rights: 
“Arundathiyar men were brutally repressive towards the Mathammas, closely monitoring their 
movements and forbidding their association with Adidravidar-led Sangam since the Sangem was 
campaigning against the sexual exploitation of the Mathammas,” (Anandhi, 2017, p.101).  
 
However, some Devadasis objected to the bill and the interference by the sangem, because “they 
considered themselves sophisticated and learned artists rather than prostitutes,” (Ramamrithammal, 
2003, p.100). This is not surprising, as scholars such as Ramberg have argued for a different 
interpretation of Devadasi life. Whilst these girls are dedicated to a local goddess and the temple, it 
has been argued that they live a much better life than dalit women who marry a husband. Ramberg 
studied the jogatis community in Karnataka who offer their daughters in marriage to the goddess 
Yellama. She argues that the girls have more agency and value than dalit women with husbands, as 
they claim certain privileges that are usually bestowed upon a son, when they are dedicated to the 
goddess. These include arranging marriages and making payments for jobs for the children of their 
sisters (Ramberg, 2014, p.33). Cecilia Van Hollen enforces this view, stating that “having been 
dedicated to the goddess, these women gain and produce value, power and respect that parallels the 
power of Yellamma as an unmarried goddess.” (Van Hollen, 2015, p.22) Ramberg also argues that the 
lives of village-based devadasis and village-based conventional married women are one and the same. 
They “both generally maintain a lifelong exclusive orientation toward one man, both rely on their 
relationship for means of economic survival, and neither takes cash payments for sexual acts 
(Ramberg, 2014, p.33). This is showing that their lives are no different from the Adidravidars women, 
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and yet Mathamma girls are considered prostitutes. Ramberg believes the view of dedication girls as 
prostitutes is a result of colonisation, as many categories referring to people being associated with 
labour practices, sexual arrangements and performative arts (such as Veshya , sule, kanki, etc.) could 
not be conveyed in English terms. Therefore, “these distinctions collapsed into the figure of the 
prostitute,” (Ramberg, 2014, p.44). Despite this, many Mathamma girls are happy to continue being 
dedicated to the Goddess, and this is an example of how feminist and dalit right groups can cause 
more problems than they resolve.  
 
Panchami Lands 
The Sangem also assisted the dalit women with their struggle to recover Panchami lands. Panchami 
lands were assigned to Dalits in Tamil Nadu during the British rule, and can neither be sold nor re-
classified (Anandhi, 2000, p.2). These lands are extremely important to dalit women in particular, as it 
gives them a chance to farm their own land and be independent from the Naidu upper caste. The 
Panchami land rights campaign was created in 2008, led by a partnership between ActionAid India 
and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (D.M.K.). This campaign was a success, and 10,000 
applications for Panchami lands were submitted (Binoy, 2010, p.50). It is this success that makes the 
Sangem-led struggle so important. In 2009, 300 acres of Panchami lands were taken by a high court 
judge, Justice P.D. Dinakaran, and the Sangem led the struggle to retrieve them. The demands were 
taken to court and sadly, they did not win back their lands. However, it was not a total failure. The 
dalit women continued to fight for their lands for many years and, in 2012, dalit women planned to 
lead a protest and plough the land that legitimately belonged to them, with the support of the 
Women’s Front and the Tamil Nadu Untouchability Eradication Front. This attracted the attention of 
local government enforcers, and a peace meeting was called between the Deputy superintendent of 
police, the Sub Collector and the village leaders. They came to a peaceful agreement and many lands 
that had been taken by upper castes were returned to Dalits across the Villipuram district (IRDS, 
2012).  
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Dalit Community Tensions 
Tamil Nadu has been very effective at implementing development schemes, which have had an 
impact on the upward mobility of Adidravidas women. The MGNREGA was one of these schemes, a 
100-day work programme that had a high level of Adidravidas women participating. (Kalairasan, 
2014, p.62). They have also used the microcredit loan schemes, which have allowed them freedom 
from debt to the Naidus, and provided them with an independent image (Anandhi, 2017, p.116).  
 
However, the Arundhathiyar women have found these programmes difficult to take part in. Their men 
have controlled their participation in these projects, claiming that the Adidravidas Dalits are not trying 
to help them become socially mobile, but are attempting to claim a higher caste status for themselves 
by labelling the Arundhathiyars as backwards and unmodern (Anandhi, 2017, p.111). Their choices to 
continue the dedication practices has also prevented them from being eligible for microcredit loans, as 
they do not fit the strict criteria required. In this way, it is the Arundhathiyar men and their choices to 
continue traditional caste practices that are preventing their women from obtaining social mobility. 
The Adidravidars women have proved that it is possible to become socially mobile, and their men 
support and encourage their actions.  
 
This section has shown how SHG and NGO can be used by dalit women as a successful means of 
combatting social injustice. The Adidravidas challenged and subverted the discrimination they have 
faced with success, and have rejected the Naidus attempts to identify them as untouchables and 
polluted. Although they were not successful in their fight for Panchami lands or the abolition of 
Mathamma dedication, they have been able to use their voices and create a life for themselves that it 
separated from the discrimination they used to face by the Naidu upper castes. Although 
Arundhathiyars did not find the same success amongst the SHG as the Adidravidas, it can be argued 
that, to a degree, their lack of success was self-inflicted. They refused help provided by the 
Adidravidas, and are content to continue dedicating their daughters to the temples, which is further 
enforcing caste exploitation and discrimination.  
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Conclusion 
Dalit women’s activism faces the same issues as all other forms of dalit activism that have been 
explored throughout this thesis. Dalit women face the struggle of oppression in traditional dalit 
settings, and also in upwardly mobile settings; the actions of these oppressions may differ, but the 
inequality still remains. This chapter has shown once again that education and the entrenched social 
divisions of caste are key elements as to why dalit women remain the victims of discrimination. Dalit 
women face judgement and punishment in all areas of their lives, both socially and domestically. 
NGOs and SHG have provided Dalits with a certain platform for progress, such as the Adidravidar 
community establishing independence from the upper caste Naidus and the women fighting for the 
abolition of Mathamma dedication, but it has not been possible to fully remedy caste discrimination 
against dalit women. To some degree, NGOs have made the separation between women in Indian 
society worse, by enforcing and encouraging the discrimination of dalit women by other caste women. 
Also, the fear and segregation that Dalits have faced has also affected the relationships between 
different dalit communities. Instead of supporting each other, often dalit communities are suspicious 
of one other and believe any help that is being offered by another dalit community has an ulterior 
motive of portraying them in a negative light. 
 
Dalit communities that have found upward social mobility brings about a completely different kind of 
oppression towards dalit women. Domestic violence is a lot more frequent in socially mobile dalit 
households, as there is anxiety to uphold the family’s new-found ‘honourable’ social status. Dalit 
women have more restrictions placed upon them, reflecting the traditions of upper-caste families. 
Whether dalit women are physically or sexually abused at home, or in the community, the police do 
not offer a safe solution. Dalit women often encounter further violence and abuse when seeking help. 
This shows that, regardless of dalit women’s upward social mobility, they have no support from other 
dalit communities, the local police, or other women. Therefore, regardless of the elements of progress 
that have occurred in women fighting for equality, these successes are relative when compared to the 
oppression and segregation that dalit women still suffer in Indian society.  
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Conclusion 
This section will attempt to summarise the arguments made throughout this thesis, and answer the 
four research questions laid out in my introduction. 
 
How the caste system affects the lives and treatment of Dalits? 
It is clearly evident that the caste system is the focal point of Hindu society. It is the religious 
foundation in which Hindu hierarchy and Indian life was built upon, and it is interwoven into every 
aspect of Indian contemporary culture. The caste system was behind the creation of the notion of 
‘untouchability’ and is the reason why pollution and caste-based discrimination is still occurring in 
India, over 60 years after it was outlawed. The caste system hierarchy is a huge factor that affects 
government decisions, employment, education and law enforcement services. It is entrenched in the 
belief systems of millions of Hindus across India, which makes it nearly impossible to escape from. 
 
Has the government attempted to close the gap of inequality? 
Since untouchability was outlawed, the government created A.A. in the form of employment and 
education reservations, in an attempt to bridge the social inequality between Dalits and other castes. 
This was not completely successful. In many ways, it has worsened the social divide, as it has 
segregated and labelled Dalits as minorities, which has caused an increased vulnerability for them in 
terms of caste-based violence and further discrimination. The reservations have angered upper castes, 
as jobs that were previously occupied by them are now being reserved purely for minorities. This has 
caused some violent backlash to occur. 
The lack of implementation of government reservations and lack of consequences for companies who 
are not following quota percentages hints that the government may not be as concerned with 
eradicating untouchability as it appears. This suggestion is enforced by the vast inequality in 
education. Education is one of the biggest issues affecting discrimination and caste-based oppression 
in India. If every chid received the same level of education, which taught of equality and not of 
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entrenched social divides, this would solve the issue of Dalits being considered polluted by others. 
Also, if they received the same level of education, it would solve the issue of education quotas, and 
the claims that dalit children should not receive reservations as they cannot keep up with the 
workload. Furthermore, by providing children with equal access to education, they would grow up 
with knowledge of their basic human rights. Eventually, if children continued to receive equal 
education enriched with teachings about people viewed as equals rather than steps in a hierarchy, then 
A.A. would no longer be necessary. A.A. has not been a complete failure in regards to the dalit quest 
for social justice, but an important stepping stone. It has provided Dalits with a voice and a platform, 
to encourage them to fight for their own equal rights.  
 
In what ways have Dalits fought for their social inequality? 
One of their biggest issues that Dalits face is their lack of belief in their own self-worth. This has 
occurred through generations of oppression and Dalits being told they are unworthy, once again due 
to the teachings and beliefs of India’s entrenched caste divisions. As the government has been unable 
(or unwilling) to eradicate this prejudice, Dalits have begun to seek an escape from Hindu society.  
 
Religious conversion has been reasonably successful for providing this escape. Dr. Ambedkar was 
fully motivated to his ideal of scrapping Hinduism and encouraging Dalits to convert en masse to 
Buddhism, in order to live a peaceful discriminatory-free life. Neo- Buddhism has been successful in 
providing a unified interpretation of Buddhism for Dalits, and a united front to fight caste-based 
discrimination. However, it has not been strong enough to provide a discriminatory-free life for 
Dalits. As Buddhism is viewed to be a branch of Hinduism, it prevents converts from identifying as 
completely separate from Hinduism and its caste system. This further enforces that it may never be 
possible for Dalits to escape cate- related stigma and oppression whilst residing in a Hindu-based 
India. The only positive aspect of being encompassed in Hinduism is that Buddhist converts are still 
entitled to reservations. 
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Dalits that converted to Christianity to escape caste-based social injustice have faced a worse 
situation. Conversion to Christianity has been heavily objected to, and seen as Dalits abandoning their 
religion and their God. Dalits have faced severe penalties for converting, including the denial of 
government reservation rights. Perhaps the loss of reservations would have been worth it if dalit 
converts could have lived a discriminatory-free life, but that has been proved impossible amongst 
Catholic communities, who are still heavily influenced by the caste system. 
 
Furthermore, conversion to Christianity has also caused an increase in caste-related violence, as upper 
castes and Hindu nationalists are retaliating to the conversions. This enforced that Dalits will never be 
free and safe whilst the entrenched social divisions remain; They are treated poorly if they accept the 
social status that have been given, ad are punished if they try to improve it. 
 
This can also be seen in the daily lives of dalit women, as they face oppression in both traditional and 
upwardly mobile settings. In the traditional setting, women are treated as sexual slaves and objects by 
the upper castes. Even women from upper castes treat them as polluted and untouchable. The steps 
that have been supposedly put in place to assist dalit women to gain independence from upper castes; 
in reality have only served to enforce the social divisions between women. This is another indication 
of the government being content for the existence of caste discrimination to remain in India.  
 
In the communities that have been successful in creating social mobility, the dalit women then face 
discrimination within their own households, at the hands of their husbands. They are often controlled 
and become victims of domestic violence. This is the result of a society built upon hierarchy. Those at 
the bottom live in constant fear of being punished for a social status they cannot control and, when 
they finally achieve an elevation in society, the feat that it will be taken from them culminates in 
anger and resentment of their own kin. 
 
Will Dalits ever live in a life free of discrimination? 
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It is for these reasons that the issue of untouchability has remained a huge contemporary issue in 
Indian society. Those in power are not truly committed to resolving the issue of caste, and those 
affected by the social injustice do not have the means and influence to change it. In order for the 
practice of untouchability to be truly eradicated, India would need to undergo a complete reformation 
of its education system and the religious foundations in which its society is built. In effect, India 
would need to denounce the entire caste system and all of its encompassing beliefs of hierarchy and 
discrimination. This would remedy the caste-based oppression that Dalits have faced for centuries but, 
in doing so, it would splinter the entire foundation that Indian society is built upon. This seems to be 
the only way to remove the entrenched notion of untouchability from Dalits, which would enable 
them to live as equals in India. 
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